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GOVERNMENT CHOICES IN INNOVATION FUNDING (WITH
REFERENCE TO CLIMATE CHANGE)
Joshua D. Sarnoff∗
ABSTRACT
Huge amounts of money will soon be spent by governments and private
entities to develop technology to reduce the costs of climate change mitigation
and adaptation, and to deploy new energy and transportation infrastructures.
Incredibly, we still lack any good idea of the best means of providing massive
amounts of government or private money so as to promote the most innovation
and technology diffusion at the lowest cost. This Article seeks to support better
analyses of, and decision making regarding, the choices of government
innovation-funding mechanisms by discussing the limits of current analyses
and providing a taxonomy of such measures. It also proposes future work to
better analyze what we know about these choices and their relative
effectiveness, and it discusses new measures to expand our knowledge base,
which include: (1) better tracking of government innovation-funding inputs
and outputs; (2) better documentation of and self-conscious decision making
regarding funding choices; and (3) creating experiments that go beyond
existing natural experiments.
INTRODUCTION
Huge amounts of money will soon be spent by governments (including
government agencies, laboratories, corporations, and other public actors) and
private entities (including corporations, foundations, nonprofit entities,
universities, and others) to develop technology to reduce the costs of climate
change mitigation and adaptation, and to deploy new energy and transportation
infrastructures. As a matter of international law, developed country members
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of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)1
committed in the 2010 Cancun Agreement2 to transfer public and private funds
and technology for mitigation measures to developing countries. The agreed
funding was at least $30 billion per year, rising to at least $100 billion per year
by 2020. In the 2011 Durban Platform,3 the UNFCCC reaffirmed that
commitment and created the framework institutional structure for
implementing it. Recent analyses suggest that number is low by an order of
magnitude, as developing countries may need at least $1 trillion per year to
meet mitigation and adaptation needs.4 As a matter of market economics, tens
(and perhaps hundreds) of trillions of dollars will soon flow to develop and
disseminate a wide range of new technologies to upgrade energy,
transportation, and other infrastructure; to develop low greenhouse gasemitting consumer and industrial products; and to mitigate and adapt to the
effects of climate change (collectively referred to as climate change
technologies).5 These funds will come either from governments or, by default,

1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, S. TREATY DOC. No. 102-38, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
2 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties, 16th Sess.,
Cancun, Mex., Nov. 29 to Dec. 10, 2010, Report of the Conference of the Parties, ¶¶ 98–99, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011) [hereinafter UNFCCC Cancun Agreement], available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2.
3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties, 17th Sess.,
Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28 to Dec. 9, 2011, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform
for Enhanced Action, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/L.10 (Dec. 10, 2011) [hereinafter UNFCCC Durban
Platform], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/l10.pdf; see also United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties, 17th Sess., Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28 to
Dec. 11, 2011, Report of the Conference of the Parties, ¶¶ 126–43, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9 (Mar. 15,
2012) [hereinafter UNFCCC Durban WG-LCA Decisions], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
2011/cop17/eng/09.pdf.
4 See Meena Raman, Trillions of Dollars Needed for Climate Finance, SOUTH CENTRE (Aug. 17, 2012),
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1818%3Atrillions-of-dollarsneeded-for-climate-finance-17-august-2012&catid=149%3Asouthnews&Itemid=355&lang=en
(discussing
converging estimates based on published studies by the World Bank, the United Nations, and the International
Energy Administration); see also WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: DEVELOPMENT AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 257–85 (2010) (estimating cost-effective mitigation measures between $4 and $25 trillion
over the next century for a 420–425 ppm CO2e stabilization scenario, and discussing the funding needed for
both mitigation and adaptation technology development and deployment).
5 See, e.g., BERNICE LEE ET AL., WHO OWNS OUR LOW CARBON FUTURE?: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 3 (2009) (discussing International Energy Agency (IEA) and Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) studies); WORLD BANK, supra note 4, at 261 (discussing anticipated
transportation and other investments); Lawrence H. Goulder & William A. Pizer, The Economics of Climate
Change 13 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 06-06, 2006) (discussing anticipated investments in
energy infrastructure); Raman, supra note 4 (referencing an IEA 2012 study of energy technology that
predicted $370 billion annual investments by 2020 in power generation infrastructure in a two-degree Celsius
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from private sources subject to government incentives and regulation of market
behaviors.
Incredibly, after centuries of experience, we still lack any clear theory or
good comparative empirical analyses from which to determine the best form of
deploying such massive amounts of government money, inducing private
money, or creating public–private partnerships (PPPs) to promote the most
innovation, technology development, and diffusion at the lowest cost.6 The
most relevant theoretical analyses stress the general advantages of public
financing and public-domain treatment of innovations over private financing
and intellectual property rights, based on the economic theories that such rights
lead to reduced consumer welfare (deadweight losses) in the absence of perfect
price discrimination, and that single-market taxation is less efficient than
broad-based taxation.7 They also identify a number of superior features of
government funding, including: the ability to shift resources to the most
promising investments when the initial approach to innovation is uncertain,
and better coordination of funding levels or parties to avoid inefficiently low
entry levels or duplication of efforts.8 They recognize, however, that
intellectual property rights sometimes have superior features to alternatives
such as prizes and subsidies.9 Overlapping (“hybrid”) approaches may
temperature-rise scenario, increasing to $630 billion between 2020 and 2030 and $760 billion between 2030
and 2050).
6 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 624 (1962) (“There is
clear need for further study of alternative methods of compensation [for inventions].”); cf., e.g., Ger Klaassen
et al., The Impact of R&D on Innovation for Wind Energy in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, 54
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 227 (2005) (discussing how governments should address infrastructure challenges and
manage associated fiscal and macroeconomic risks); Gerd Schwartz et al., Introduction to PUBLIC INVESTMENT
AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: ADDRESSING INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGES AND MANAGING FISCAL
RISKS 1, 1 (Gerd Schwartz et al. eds., 2008) (same). See generally GER KLAASSEN ET AL., INT’L INST. FOR
APPLIED SYS. ANALYSIS, IR-03-011, PUBLIC R&D AND INNOVATION: THE CASE OF WIND ENERGY IN
DENMARK, GERMANY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (2003) (providing a comparative analysis of one technology
across three countries), available at http://webarchive.iiasa.ac.at/Admin/PUB/Documents/IR-03-011.pdf;
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND PUBLIC POLICY (Yong S. Lee ed., 1997) (discussing different collaborative
interactions among research universities, federal laboratories, and industries in the United States).
7 See, e.g., Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive
System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 54 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2002); Stephen M.
Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Procuring Knowledge, in 15 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ENTREPRENUERSHIP: ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
1, 2, 27 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2004).
8 See, e.g., Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 21–23 (also noting the assumption that ideas for
development and approaches to problem solving are common knowledge).
9 See, e.g., Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 54–55 (noting potentially superior knowledge of costs
and benefits of R&D for screening investments; the potential to elicit higher levels of effort—like a lottery

SARNOFF GALLEYSPROOFS1

1090

6/11/2013 9:03 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1087

sometimes be needed to correct perverse incentives of providing either public
or private financing. Public or private financing choices may depend on
whether and when the social value and costs of developing ideas are known,
observable, and able to be aggregated.10 This is particularly true where private
firms possess information on value or costs that needs to be aggregated for
efficient decision making, and when only the government can compel such
information to be disclosed.11 Accordingly, these analyses highlight the
importance of comparative analysis of public and private institutions and of
their innovation-relevant features.12
There are many types of innovation, moreover, including: product and
process, institutional, complementary, and marketing. It is commonplace to
distinguish innovation—understood as reduction of ideas to practice—from
invention—understood as the conception of ideas (although not limited to
functional ideas that are the subject of patent rights).13 However, the
boundaries of these categories are not conceptually distinct, and the categories
may hide rather than reveal important intersections of different kinds of
activities.14 Innovation is also often equated with commercialization—or
applied research (as distinguished from basic research)—although achieving
practical applications does not always involve commercial activity for the
applications to become widespread.15
Further, scientific and technological developments do not usually follow a
linear path. Given this heterogeneity, it is intuitively unlikely that there are
compared to a certain, fixed lower sum; and the ability to avoid taxpayer revolts for certain kinds of
investments).
10 Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 1, 4–6, 21–23; Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 54–55, 57–
61, 65–69.
11 See, e.g., Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 57, 58 & n.3.
12 See generally Daron Acemoglu et al., The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and
Economic Growth (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9378, 2002); Edward L. Glaeser et al.,
An Economic Approach to Social Capital, 112 ECON. J. F437 (2002); Douglass C. North, Institutions, J. ECON.
PERSP., Winter 1991, at 97.
13 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, The Macro-Context of the Microeconomics of Innovation, in
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND THE GROWTH MECHANISM OF THE FREE-ENTERPRISE ECONOMIES 20,
22 (Eytan Sheshinski et al. eds., 2007) (citing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (1983); 1 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES: A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL, AND
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS (1939)).
14 See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and
Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 348–49 (2000).
15 See, e.g., id. at 349–51; Thomas Brzustowski, Government Assistance to and Policy Toward
Innovation, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Canada–United States Law Institute Conference on
Comparative Aspects of Innovation in Canada and the United States (Apr. 7–8, 2006), in 32 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 39,
39, 41 (2006) [hereinafter Can.–U.S. Proceedings 2006].
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simple or necessary answers to what works best, when, and why. Recent (and
long-standing) comparative institutional and country analyses suggest that
effective government choices concerning the form of innovation funding are
contingent and contextual, rather than necessary and invariant.16 Theoretical
analyses suggest that the most efficient incentive mechanism may be contextspecific, path-dependent (considering, inter alia, historic patterns of trade), and
reliant on the efficiency of licensing markets.17 The fundamental assumptions
driving decision making also may require additional justification, but analyses
to identify when the assumptions hold may be lacking.18 Further, theoretical or
institutional analyses may not evaluate all relevant potential alternatives,19 or
analyze the comparative abilities and potential abilities of private- and publicsector decision makers.

16 See, e.g., DAN BREZNITZ, INNOVATION AND THE STATE: POLITICAL CHOICE AND STRATEGIES FOR
GROWTH IN ISRAEL, TAIWAN, AND IRELAND 17 (2007) (“There are many ways by which state and industry can
interlink, and each one of them necessitates a different division of labor and gives rise to different industrial
capabilities. . . . [W]e no longer can view the state as a unitary actor.”); VANNEVAR BUSH, SCIENCE: THE
ENDLESS FRONTIER 14–17 (1945) (discussing relative abilities and limitations of university-based,
government-agency-based, and industry-based research); id. at 26–27 (discussing “five fundamentals” of
government support for scientific R&D promoted by a national science foundation: (1) funding stability; (2)
employee knowledge, capabilities, and interests; (3) support for external not intramural research; (4) internal
control over the research by university fundees; and (5) budgetary controls and political accountability); MARK
DODGSON & JOHN BESSANT, EFFECTIVE INNOVATION POLICY: A NEW APPROACH 3–4 (1996) (noting the
diversity in government policies and needs of firms, particularly with regard to resources, competencies, and
innovative capabilities).
17 Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 1–2; Philippe Aghion et al., Carbon Taxes, Path Dependency
and Directed Technical Change: Evidence from the Auto Industry 2–5 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei,
Working Paper No. 99.2012, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2202047.
18 For example, economists tend to assume that innovation will be maximized and investment will reach
efficient levels if private returns on investment are equated with the social value of the innovations.
Economists also note that intellectual property may be inefficient where social value is not appropriable or the
rewards are too low to cover R&D costs, whereas prize rewards should be set below social value where the
costs are expected to be lower than the social value. See, e.g., Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 60–62;
Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 2, 10. See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of
Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 29, 31. However, these
analyses may fail to adequately account for positive externalities (social-welfare-enhancing spillovers) that are
generated when lower private returns are sufficient to induce investments in making innovations. See, e.g.,
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1032, 1044 (2005).
When this will occur, however, is not always clear. These conflicting analyses also may reflect differing views
about whether innovation is a continuous or discontinuous function of investments.
19 For example, the economics literature focuses on intellectual property, government procurement,
government grants, and other subsidies, and somewhat less frequently on “intramural” government research
(i.e., direct development), but it typically does not address government creation of commons. Maurer &
Scotchmer, supra note 7, at 17; see infra Part II (classifying measures).
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This Article seeks to provide a better understanding of these choices.20 Part
I summarizes some basic insights regarding government innovation funding
choices that do not take us very far, some analytic approaches that have been
developing, and suggestions for their expansion that might get us much
farther.21 Part II provides a taxonomy of the government innovation funding
choices that demonstrates similarities and differences among the choices and
identifies some interrelationships among them. The taxonomy may provide
some immediate assistance to decision makers and analysts by highlighting the
possibilities, and by denaturalizing the existing choices to counteract the
gravitational pull toward path dependence.
I. BASIC INSIGHTS AND NEW APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING
GOVERNMENT INNOVATION CHOICES
Research and development (R&D), particularly basic R&D, are public
goods with substantial positive spillovers. They require government funding or
other inducements to reach social-welfare-maximizing levels because
commercial markets will otherwise underproduce them.22 Similarly,
infrastructure is a public good that private commercial markets are expected to
underproduce. Infrastructure thus requires public investment, whether through
(1) direct government provision; (2) government subsidization of fixed costs;
(3) some form of nonprofit-sector supply (which may imply government tax
subsidies); or (4) commercial provision by charging above marginal costs
(which may imply antitrust or sectoral market regulation, intellectual property
rights, or other government action).23
20 Cf. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) (proposing a new executive entity that would focus on cross-agency innovation
policies).
21 I hope in future articles to expand on the insights provided here and to provide more refined
suggestions for better tracking of inputs to and outputs of innovation funding, for mandatory documentation of
decision making, and for creation of innovation experiments across jurisdictions.
22 See, e.g., EDWIN S. MILLS, THE BURDEN OF GOVERNMENT 40 (1986); see also DOMINIQUE FORAY,
ECONOMICS OF KNOWLEDGE 8, 16 (2004) (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economic Implications of Learning
by Doing, 29 REV. ECON. STUD. 155 (1962); Nathan Rosenberg, Learning by Using, in INSIDE THE BLACK
BOX: TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 120 (Nathan Rosenberg ed., 1982)) (noting the public-good character of
knowledge and differences between private and social returns, as well as the claim that knowledge production
may occur even if it is not the immediate goal, in light of learning by doing and learning by using).
23 See, e.g., FRITZ MACHLUP, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85th CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 16–17 (Comm. Print
1958) (discussing “expenses beyond the means of private concerns” and noting four government alternatives
to promote additional R&D beyond what the private sector would provide: research grants or subsidies; prizes
or bonuses; monopoly grants through patents; and government research agencies); BRETT M. FRISCHMANN,
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Government decision making may dramatically affect R&D markets.24 For
example, government decision makers use a mix of mechanisms to promote
innovation,25 and they tend to rely more heavily on particular forms of funding
choices for technology development and economic growth in different
industrial sectors. Government procurement has predominated for R&D in
national defense (given the government’s historic monopoly on military
activity), whereas subsidies to universities (and to some private firms) for basic
R&D—combined with intellectual property rights and private funding for
applied R&D—have predominated for pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.26
Further, it is often and inappropriately assumed27 that we need to rely on
private industry expertise and intellectual property rights to perform applied
research and to commercialize innovations that derive from basic research, at
least for research that is already subsidized by the government.28
Beyond these basic and important (but sometimes wrong) insights, we
know far too little to intelligently guide our choices of the form of government
funding to best promote innovation. As noted over a decade ago, “Despite
wide recognition that socially efficient production of innovation (of all types)
requires a comprehensive, complicated ‘mix’ of federal institutions,
comparative institutional analysis is lacking, particularly in terms of mixed
systems that rely on multiple institutions.”29 Further, a wide range of
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 5–6, 12–15 (2012) (describing infrastructure as
an “impure public good” because of capacity limits).
24 See, e.g., BREZNITZ, supra note 16, at 26–28 (discussing “systems-of-innovation” theories that seek to
explain R&D by reference to location within the industrial system, financing, and industrial opportunities, all
of which are affected by state decisions).
25 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 350.
26 See, e.g., FORAY, supra note 22, at 225–27 (citing Iain M. Cockburn, The Changing Structure of the
Pharmaceutical Industry, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 10); VERNON W. RUTTAN, IS WAR NECESSARY FOR
ECONOMIC GROWTH?: MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 108–09 (2006)
(contrasting defense-related research funding for computers and semiconductors with defense-related research
funding for software, and noting declines in defense-related funding of academic institutions and shifts of such
funding toward applied R&D in the 1980s); see also Frischmann, supra note 14, at 380 (noting that subsidies
or procurement are needed for areas such as national defense because intellectual property exclusive rights are
ineffective in markets for products with non-rivalrous consumption); Rebecca Henderson & Iain Cockburn,
Scale, Scope, and Spillovers: The Determinants of Research Productivity in Drug Discovery, 27 RAND J.
ECON. 32, 56 (1996) (finding substantial inter-firm spillovers of R&D knowledge in the pharmaceutical
industry).
27 See Frischmann, supra note 14, at 347 n.2 (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private
Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663
(1996)) (discussing problems with justifications for the approach chosen, and noting that economic theory
suggests adoption of non-uniform approaches); infra notes 64–76 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 395–413.
29 Id. at 350.
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government decision making that is not directly targeted at innovation can
affect the markets for which innovation is desired.30 Globalization of
production31 and cultural and historical differences among nations32 only
multiply the questions that are unanswered.
A. Limits to Existing Input–Output Analyses, and Institution-Based and
Creativity-Based Approaches
Some past analytic efforts to get at these issues have examined the
proportion of government R&D spending on activities undertaken directly by
the government compared to those undertaken by the private and nonprofit
sectors. These studies noted the difficulty of determining how much R&D—
even for basic science—should be undertaken or sponsored by the public
sector.33 The outputs of such innovation funding, moreover, typically are not
tracked, much less analyzed to determine how the outputs relate to the various
types of spending inputs.34 Even if the outputs were tracked and analyzed,
there would be substantial difficulties in determining which inputs and outputs
to measure and how far downstream to look.35 Further, in comparing the inputs
and outputs across different technological fields, the market structures may be
affected by the innovations themselves.36
30 See, e.g., BREZNITZ, supra note 16, at 26–28; Frischmann, supra note 14, at 351–52 (discussing “costly
distortions” of markets by “poorly targeted” government interventions).
31 See, e.g., BREZNITZ, supra note 16, at 20–25 (noting the growth of worldwide production networks and
increasing fragmentation of the production process and research into “global production networks”).
32 See, e.g., id. at 6 (noting the existence of multiple, but very different, successful national models of
technology development in the information technology sector, and identifying three factors that affect state–
industry relations and international and financial interactions: (1) state acquisition of knowledge and skills; (2)
states addressing research market failures by lowering private entry risks; and (3) states acting to link local
industry with multinational corporations and financial markets).
33 See, e.g., KEITH NORRIS & JOHN VAIZEY, THE ECONOMICS OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 104–20
(1973).
34 See, e.g., Alan Nymark, Canadian Governmental Support for Innovation, Remarks at the Proceedings
of the Canada–United States Law Institute Conference on Promoting and Protecting Innovation in a Changing
World (Apr. 21–23, 1995), in 21 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 37, 42 (1995); cf. LAURA ANADON ET AL., BELFER CTR. FOR
SCI. & INT’L AFFAIRS, U.S. PUBLIC ENERGY INNOVATION INSTITUTIONS AND MECHANISMS: STATUS AND
DEFICIENCIES 1 (2010) (stating that “all initiatives and institutions [should be] required to consistently collect
metrics on relevant outputs and outcomes and information about projects”).
35 See, e.g., Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch, Innovation and Technological Change: An Overview,
in INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 1, 3–6 (Zoltan J. Acs &
David B. Audretsch eds., 1991) (noting typical measures of research expenditure inputs, intermediate
outputs—such as the number of inventions and patent counts, and direct measures of output—such as
databases of innovations, and discussing problems with these measures).
36 See, e.g., F. M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES 1 (1984); Acs &
Audretsch, supra note 35, at 3, 15–16 (citing Simon Kuznets, Inventive Activity: Problems of Definition and
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Notwithstanding these difficulties, there are very good reasons to try to
understand these issues better so as to improve innovation policy. This is
particularly true regarding climate change mitigation and adaptation
technologies, and infrastructure investments—given the importance of the
needs and magnitude of the social and fiscal costs to be borne by the world, or
more parochially by particular countries. Among these reasons are: improving
competitive trade position; reducing adverse impacts of climate change more
effectively and quickly; reducing burdens to the economy of effectuating
climate policy; and reducing foreign aid and treaty compliance costs.
In contrast to the paucity of our macrounderstanding of these innovation
funding choices,37 substantial microanalyses have been developing regarding
invention and innovation and their promotion. These analyses address, inter
alia: the economics of intellectual property;38 the variety of innovation
paradigms beyond mass-market sellers of products (and particularly the
development of user-innovation and user-generated content);39 and the
determinants of invention- and innovation-creation behaviors. These
determinants include, but are not limited to: whether innovation inputs and
outputs are recognized as property rights or use other control mechanisms,
such as access and employee mobility restraints; and whether the inputs and
Measurement, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY, supra note 6, at 19); Wesley M. Cohen
& Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Structure, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 1059 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989); Partha Dasgupta, The Theory of
Technological Competition, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 519 (Joseph E.
Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson eds., 1986); P. Dasgupta & J. Stiglitz, Industrial Structure and the Nature of
Innovative Activity, 90 ECON. J. 266 (1980); see also Uwe Cantner & Marco Guerzoni, Innovation and the
Evolution of Industries: A Tale of Incentives, Knowledge and Needs, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 382, 382–98 (David B. Audretsch et al., 2011); Wesley M. Cohen,
Richard C. Levin & David C. Mowery, Firm Size and R&D Intensity: A Re-Examination, 35 J. INDUS. ECON.
543 (1987) (finding that overall firm size has an insignificant effect on business unit R&D intensity); cf.
RICHARD D. ROBINSON, THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY: THEORY, ISSUES, AND PRACTICE 3
(1988) (noting the difficulty of defining units of technology, particularly for disembodied technology, i.e.,
human skill).
37 An excellent summary of research on the relationship between innovation and environmental
regulation is provided in David Popp et al., Energy, the Environment, and Technological Change 4–6 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14832, 2009).
38 An excellent, short summary is provided in Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual
Property Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1475 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds.,
2007). Another summary may be found in Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lecture, Economic Foundations of Intellectual
Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693 (2008).
39 See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the Global Intellectual
Property Regime, 41 CONN. L. REV. 861, 884–89 (2009); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators:
Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008); Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated
Discontent: Transformation in Practice, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 497 (2008).
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outputs are developed within firms, traded in markets, or subject to cross-firm
collaborations that defy expectations of vertical integration or rely on unusual
contract structures to deal with uncertainties.40 Comparatively little attention,
by contrast, has been devoted to problems of valuation and bilateral
contracting resulting in the illiquidity of markets for property rights in
innovations. This has resulted in the consequent need to facilitate the
development of such rights markets through trading exchanges (such as the
recently created Intellectual Property Exchange International, IPXI) to better
promote innovation and technology development and diffusion.41
Substantial analyses now exist regarding the personal and organizational
determinants of various forms of innovative “creativity” (i.e., “new,”
“appropriate,” and—arguably—not “readily identifiable” outcomes) for people
located in different settings, fields, and geographies.42 These determinants
40 See, e.g., Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm
Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004); Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the
Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1650–54 (2009) (citing, inter alia,
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975);
Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, The Management of Innovation, 109 Q.J. ECON. 1185 (1994)); Dan L. Burk,
Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 3–4 (2004); Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The
Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 575, 576–78; Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm
Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 435–36 (2009); Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge
Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 1123 (2007); Nicholas J. Houpt, Financing Innovation: Braiding, Monitoring, and Uncertainty, 62
SYRACUSE L. REV. 337, 338–42 (2012); see also Anthony J. Casey, Mind Control: Firms and the Production
of Ideas, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1061, 1062–64, 1070 (2012) (noting the failure of theory-of-the-firm
literature to address the “how” of “idea production,” discussing the inability of property theories to explain
such production given the difficulty of observing and controlling the products of individuals’ minds,
identifying as relevant variables things like types of production inputs, need for collaboration, and reputational
effects on disclosures, and suggesting that such factors may have more influence than the strength of property
rights); David J. Teece, Business Models, Business Strategy and Innovation, 43 LONG RANGE PLAN. 172
(2010) (identifying various methods that firms can use to capture value from innovations, such as bundling
innovative technology into consumer-oriented products and naked licensing, and noting the dependence of
such choices on relative perfection and enforceability of property rights).
41 See, e.g., Dietmar Harhoff, The Role of Patents and Licenses in Securing External Finance for
Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 55;
James E. Malackowski, The Next Big Thing in Monetizing IP: A Natural Progression to Exchange-Traded
Units, LANDSLIDE, May/June 2011, at 32; Gerard Pannekoek, Emerging IP Monetization Solutions: The
Institutionalization of an IP Exchange 4–8 (May 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.ipxi.com/system/files/Oxford%20IP%20Research%20Centre1.pdf; cf. Richard Bis, Financing
Innovation: A Project Finance Approach to Funding Patentable Innovation, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Nov.
2009, at 14, 14–17 (discussing growth in patent markets that make an invention company feasible and project
finance desirable). See generally IPX INT’L, www.ipxi.com (last visited May, 12, 2013).
42 Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology
of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2002–04 (2011); see also David J. Teece, Knowledge and
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include intrinsic and extrinsic motivations (and their interactions);43 different
forms of collaboration, including widespread “peer production” (i.e., dispersed
contributions);44 and convergent and divergent thinking (i.e., analytic and
intuitive reasoning)45 for identifying and solving different kinds of problems.46
The psychological determinants include rhetoric (principally regarding the
“origins” of our intellectual property system) that is used to justify or challenge
the existing norms and legal conditions for different forms of creativity, for
example, by “valu[ing] . . . group-oriented productivity over individual
creation.”47
But so far these promising avenues of organizational, market, and
psychological research regarding factors affecting innovation have not been
developed to carefully address the questions of whether, when, and how
particular types of creativity and innovation are promoted by the different
Competence as Strategic Assets, in 1 HANDBOOK ON KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 129 (Clyde W. Holsapple
ed., 2003) (discussing different forms of knowledge that firms may exploit for value generation, and
differential abilities to replicate, imitate, and appropriate value from such knowledge).
43 Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 789, 794–98
(discussing problems of determining when the moral right of attribution should be required based on the
relationship between authors and their works or on cultural conceptions of audiences).
44 See, e.g., Greg Elmer, Research Overview: Collaboration-Led Research, 37 CANADIAN J. COMM., no.
1, 2012, at 189, 189; Georg von Krogh & Sebastian Spaeth, The Open Source Software Phenomenon:
Characteristics That Promote Research, 16 J. STRATEGIC INFO. SYS. 236 (2007); Mandel, supra note 42, at
2001 (“Open and collaborative peer production involves widely dispersed contributions to a project by vast
networks of individuals working towards a common goal. These individuals may be spread across the globe,
may rarely interact, and may not even know each other.”); Fred Gault & Eric von Hippel, The Prevalence of
User Innovation and Free Innovation Transfers: Implications for Statistical Indicators and Innovation Policy
(MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4722-09, 2009), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/
handle/1721.1/65619/Fred%20and%20Eric%202009%20%202-2-09%20FDG.pdf?sequence=1. See generally
ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND
COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008).
45 See Mandel, supra note 42, at 2004 (“Originality often requires divergent thought processes, which
involve significantly intuitive cognitive function, while appropriateness often requires convergent evaluation, a
more analytic thought process. . . . Divergent ideation itself can involve either or both of two different types of
creative thought: problem-finding and problem-solving.” (footnotes omitted)).
46 Id. at 2000–04; Jessica Silbey, Harvesting Intellectual Property: Inspired Beginnings and “WorkMakes-Work,” Two Stages in the Creative Processes of Artists and Innovators, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2091,
2093–94 (2011).
47 See, e.g., Jessica Silbey, Comparative Tales of Origins and Access: Intellectual Property and the
Rhetoric of Social Change, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 195, 201 (2010). See generally James Boyle, The Second
Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring
2003, at 33; Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual
Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008). The described deployed narratives may be inaccurate in light of historical
analyses of the effects of intellectual property on innovation, which suggest that creating or enhancing patent
rights does not always promote innovation. See, e.g., Petra Moser, Patents and Innovation: Evidence from
Economic History, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2013, at 23, 39–40.
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forms of government funding that can occur. These analyses would have to
address the nature, kind, and degree of innovative creativity of actors in
different government institutions and in private or nonprofit institutions
operating in different market structures under different regulatory regimes
(e.g., regulated and unregulated natural and intellectual-property-created
monopolies, oligopolies, and competitive markets; complex or simple product
markets; and markets subject to significant or few intellectual property
rights).48 This absence of detailed, comparative institutional evaluations is
notable in light of the developing literature on the “new institutional
economics.”49
Unlike in some of my other work,50 I take no position here on whether and
what kinds of intellectual property rights the government should create, grant,
allow, retain, and control through these different types of funding and
regulatory mechanisms. Intellectual property rights are not incompatible with
most of the other government funding choices, such as direct subsidies or
prizes, and usually are present along with them.51 Conversely, some subsidies
that distort markets dramatically by making alternative desired innovation
technologies more or less economical—and thus more or less viable

48 Cf. Robert M. Solow, On Macroeconomic Models of Free-Market Innovation and Growth, in
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND THE GROWTH MECHANISM OF THE FREE-ENTERPRISE ECONOMIES,
supra note 13, at 15, 15 (noting the lack of joint research between macroeconomic technical-change-model
builders and those who study behavioral economics and the history of particular innovations). See generally
Kuznets, supra note 36, at 19 (discussing problems with performing such analyses); Fritz Machlup, The Supply
of Inventors and Inventions, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY, supra note 6, at 143
(discussing the non-fungibility of inventions).
49 See, e.g., Erik Stam & Bart Nooteboom, Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Institutions, in HANDBOOK
OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 421, 421–22; cf. Douglass C. North,
Institutional Bases for Capitalist Growth, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND THE GROWTH
MECHANISM OF THE FREE-ENTERPRISE ECONOMIES, supra note 13, at 35, 39 (noting the difficulty of
understanding where “beliefs, norms, and institutions come from”). See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 40;
Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, in THE NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 17 (John Harriss et al. eds., 1995); Elinor
Ostrom, Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper than Markets and Hierarchies, in HANDBOOK OF NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 819 (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005); Edward L. Rubin,
Commentary, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996); Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking
Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595 (2000).
50 See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS
L.J. 53 (2011–2012); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR, Presumptions of Validity, Preliminary Relief, and
Obviousness in Patent Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 995 (2008); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the
Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2004).
51 See Frischmann, supra note 14, at 376 (noting the need for simultaneous institutional arrangements to
address different types of market failures in research).
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substitutes—may result in intellectual property rights that are wholly
orthogonal to development or use of the innovations that are sought to be
promoted. For one important example, consider that fossil-fuel R&D and
consumption and production subsidies may lead to intellectual property rights
that have no bearing on the development of renewable energy technologies,
except regarding competitive market pricing for energy (and thus incentives to
invest in renewable energy technology development). But eliminating fossil
fuel subsidies and internalizing the carbon externalities imposed on society
from fossil fuel consumption52 would reduce the creation of such intellectual
property. More importantly, it could likely lead to more rapid greenhouse gas
(GHG) emission reductions and development of renewable energy
technologies than the subsidization of such alternatives directly.53
52 Many social harms from productive activities are not reflected in the market. See, e.g., Kenneth J.
Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket
Allocation, in JOINT ECON. COMM., 91ST CONG., THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES:
THE PPB SYSTEM 47 (Comm. Print 1969) (explaining externalities as a subset of market failures, principally
based on an inability to exclude small numbers of buyers and sellers in the relevant market). Given these
“negative externalities,” liability, regulation, or taxes must be imposed on the sources of the harms to reduce
the activity levels to more socially efficient degrees, and taxes (or marketable permits) can do so at less cost
than direct regulation. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC OUTLAYS, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 178–81 (1975);
William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 308–12, 319
(1972) (citing, inter alia, JH DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES (1968); R. H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (2d ed. 1924)). Note that
taxation to internalize carbon externalities may also have substantial revenue-raising potential, which could
then contribute to additional innovation subsidies, particularly as it may be easier to justify expenditures
related to the purposes of the tax. See, e.g., William D. Nordhaus, Carbon Taxes to Move Toward Fiscal
Sustainability, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Sept. 2010, at 1, 1–4 (proposing a carbon tax to raise revenue and noting
numerous benefits, including moving toward meeting climate-reduction goals).
53 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, REFORMING ENERGY SUBSIDIES: OPPORTUNITIES TO
CONTRIBUTE TO THE CLIMATE CHANGE AGENDA 19 (2008), available at http://www.unep.ch/etb/publications/
Energy%20subsidies/EnergySubsidiesFinalReport.pdf; Doug Koplow & John Dernbach, Federal Fossil Fuel
Subsidies and Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Case Study of Increasing Transparency for Fiscal Policy, 26
ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV’T 361, 372–73 (2001); Joseph P. Tomain, “Our Generation’s Sputnik Moment”:
Regulating Energy Innovation, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 389, 396–97, 402 (2011) (discussing the negative
externality of dirty energy from carbon emissions and the positive externalities of clean energy as reasons to
regulate innovation in the energy sector, and also noting the potential to divert money from fossil fuel
subsidies to clean energy development); Michael Barrett, Finding the Money: Securing Capital for Energy
Innovation, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Canada–United States Law Institute Henry T. King, Jr. Annual
Conference on Energy Security and Climate Change: A Canada–United States Common Approach? (Apr. 14–
16, 2011), in 36 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 277, 293 (2012) (“Once you start building those costs [of hydrocarbon
externalities] in [to conventional electric power projects], suddenly the economics of renewable projects start
to look not so bad.”). See generally CEES VAN BEERS & ANDRÉ DE MOOR, PUBLIC SUBSIDIES AND POLICY
FAILURES: HOW SUBSIDIES DISTORT THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT, EQUITY AND TRADE, AND HOW TO REFORM
THEM (2001); Bjorn Larsen & Anwar Shah, World Fossil Fuel Subsidies and Global Carbon Emissions
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1002, 1992).
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Significantly, although there are many choices of government funding for
technology innovation and diffusion, the legal-academic literature tends to
focus on only one set from the many possible approaches, even when
comparing that set to some of the alternatives. That set of choices is: reliance
on private investments, creation of intellectual property rights, and market
production with associated intellectual property rights and other forms of
market regulation. Similarly, without much detailed analysis, governments
around the world appear intent to make private investments, intellectual
property rights, and ex post market production and competition regulation the
primary approaches to developing and deploying the needed climate change
mitigation, adaptation technologies, and energy and transportation
infrastructure.54 Over the past few decades, the government’s focus on private
investment has been evidenced by the relative percentage of government
expenditures for R&D, relying on private-sector substitution.55 Nevertheless,
government-funded R&D remains important, as reflected in recent increases in
budget authority for it.56
Reliance on the private sector may be based on political constraints to
raising sufficient revenue through taxation, auctioning marketable permits, and
creating new or expanded federal bureaucracies.57 Alternatively, such reliance
54 See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 301, 307
n.30 (2011).
55 See, e.g., MICHAEL YAMANER, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., FEDERAL R&D SUPPORT SHOWS LITTLE CHANGE
IN FY 2008, at 2 tbl.1 (2009); Patrick J. Clemins, Historical Trends in Federal R&D, in RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT FY 2010, at 21 (Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci. ed., 2009).
56 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET
OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 365–71 (2012) [hereinafter OMB 2013 BUDGET
REPORT], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/spec.pdf
(noting that the FY2013 budget provides $141 billion for R&D, representing a 1% overall increase and 5%
increase for nondefense R&D compared to FY2012).
57 See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property and the Transfer of Green Technologies: An Essay on
Economic Perspectives, 1 WIPO J. 133, 136 (2009); Lawrence H. Goulder & William A. Pizer, The
Economics of Climate Change 6–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11923, 2006); see
also Frischmann, supra note 14, at 352 (noting scarcity of government funds as justifying more careful
analysis of reasons to fund basic commercial research); Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 38, at 1477
(“Probably the greatest virtue [of intellectual property] is that . . . . [n]o one is taxed more than his willingness
to pay for any unit he buys; else he would not buy it. In contrast, funding out of general revenue runs the risk
of imposing greater burdens on individual taxpayers than the benefits they receive.”); cf. Joshua D. Sarnoff,
Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 213
n.37 (1997) (citing Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State
Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1044 (1995)) (noting historic political
obstacles to raising federal revenue and to creating a national police force, which then required default to state
regulation); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (but Only from a National Perspective) for Federal
Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225, 253–54 (1997) [hereinafter Sarnoff, Continuing
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may reflect developing public preferences for private markets over government
involvement in directing the economy, either by direct development of factors
of production or by picking private “winners and losers” through subsidies and
regulation.58
Reliance on private funding, property rights, and markets that are subject to
government regulation to produce the desired innovation goals may arguably
be justified in some cases by theoretical concerns. Professor Brett Frischmann
suggested that tax mechanisms, unlike grants, should generally be used for
commercial projects because they leave specific innovation input and output
selection decisions to firms, which are “the best informed investor[s]” of the
resources.59 But it is debatable whether firms will make better decisions, given
the potential for bureaucracies to develop multi-firm expertise across projects,
markets, and technologies.60 The approach of relying on such private funds,
rights, and markets as a general strategy likely reflects deeply held belief
systems regarding private markets and government regulation much more than
carefully considered and particularized economic and political decisions.61
Imperative] (citing Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1201 (1977); John P. Dwyer, The
Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1192–93 (1995)) (noting revenue and
other constraints that may lead federal administrative agencies, particularly nascent ones, to defer to state
environmental regulation even when federal regulation would be more efficient and effective).
58 See, e.g., Neil B. Niman, Picking Winners and Losers in the Global Technology Race, CONTEMP.
ECON. POL’Y, July 1995, at 77; see also STEPHEN MOORE & DEAN STANSEL, CATO INST., POLICY ANALYSIS
225, ENDING CORPORATE WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT (1995) (“The federal government has a poor record of
picking industrial winners and losers, so the economic benefits that these programs are purported to create
inevitably fail to materialize. Furthermore, corporate welfare programs create an uneven playing field; foster
an incestuous relationship between business and government; are anti-consumer, anti-capitalist, and
unconstitutional; and create a huge drain on the federal budget.”).
59 Frischmann, supra note 14, at 352–53.
60 Cf. id. at 360 n.42, 364–66 (noting that maximizing returns on investment may not always reflect firm
values and discussing the analogy to “Bayesian learning” in regard to ex ante variable estimates of potential
research and product inputs of the outputs of initial R&D investment decisions). But cf. Arrow, supra note 6, at
609, 618–19 (discussing inefficiencies of decision making resulting from exclusive rights in information).
Further, government decisions affect the stability of taxes compared to grant mechanisms, which in turn
influences firm investment decisions. Cf. Victor Nee & Sonja Opper, Bureaucracy and Financial Markets, 62
KYKLOS 293, 298 (2009). See generally Paul W. Cherington et al., Organization and Research and
Development Decision Making Within a Government Department, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE
ACTIVITY, supra note 6 at 395.
61 See Frischmann, supra note 14, at 389–90 (noting that grants are easily justified for consumption
market failures, but less easily justified—compared to intellectual property or taxes—for other market failures
based on information signaling and decision-making differences; recognizing that even for such other market
failures, “the government is sufficiently competent at identifying innovation types . . . amenable to market
provision but for innovative process market failures, issuance of a grant may be a more targeted mechanism
than alternatives and . . . . the ability for the government to monitor controllable risks . . . may be an
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These belief systems may reflect even deeper concerns about protecting liberty
and avoiding paternalism in regard to recognizing and forming personal
preferences.62 As a Canadian academic noted in 2006, “[S]ince the election of
1993, the motto seems to have been: Inside Government spending—bad,
outside Government spending—good.”63
B. Limits to Natural-Experiments Analyses
Analyses of the United States’s adoption of the Bayh–Dole Act64 and the
subsequent worldwide proliferation of similar enactments65 have looked at the

advantage”). Compare, e.g., id. at 373 (arguing that government market intervention is justified only when
markets fail to perform efficiently and should be limited to addressing specific market failures), with
BREZNITZ, supra note 16, at 6 (describing examples of rapid, national innovation developments that were
contingent on extensive government involvement in many aspects of national innovation markets).
62 See Sarnoff, Continuing Imperative, supra note 57, at 248–50 (discussing paternalism and effectuating
jurisdictional preferences); Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1145–46 (1996)
(reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995))
(discussing conflicts of jurisdiction size with Tiebout’s thesis about citizen-sorting among jurisdictions to
effectuate their preferences). See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES
TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970); Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab,
Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON.
333 (1988); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
63 Brzustowski, supra note 15, at 42; see also Nymark, supra note 34, at 42 (“In Canada we have
traditionally relied on the government sector for doing a large part of the science and technology effort. That is
not sustainable. We have to find ways to shift the relative burden of innovation expenditures to the private
sector—not an easy thing to do.”); Stam & Nooteboom, supra note 49, at 421 (“The popularity of a policy
instrument is not necessarily an indication of consensus about its effectiveness, or clarity about its content.”);
cf. Keric D. Clanahan, Drone-Sourcing? United States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Inherently
Governmental Functions, and the Role of Contractors, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 135, 146–47 (2012) (discussing
extensive government reliance on private contractors, noting a preference for outsourcing that originated with
the Eisenhower Administration, and identifying the “inherently government function” doctrine); id. at 139
(questioning whether many tasks relating to use of unmanned aircraft are being performed by contractors “that
should be reserved exclusively for government personnel”); Joshua Goldstein, Book Note, Searching for
Innovation in Foreign Assistance, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring 2009, at 131, 131–32 (reviewing
REINVENTING FOREIGN AID (William Easterly ed., 2008)) (discussing William Easterly’s critical comparison
of Jeffrey Sachs and other foreign-aid planners to “Marxists, for whom ‘all countries are destined to attain the
goal of development, meaning industrialization and a high mass standard of living, not to mention peace and
democracy’”). But see, e.g., P. Aghion et al., Industrial Policy and Competition 2 (June 18, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1811643 (encouraging
discussion not of whether industrial sectoral policies should exist but of how they should be designed and
governed).
64 Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 201–211, 94 Stat. 3019, 3019–28 (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 201–211 (2006)) [hereinafter Bayh–Dole Act]; see Stevenson–Wydler Technology Innovation
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3714 (2006))
[hereinafter Stevenson–Wydler Act] (addressing technology transfer from government laboratories).
65 See Thomas J. Siepmann, The Global Exportation of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV.
209 (2004); cf. David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration and Incentives
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effects of these enactments on innovation, commercialization, and
dissemination of technologies.66 These analyses are perhaps the best-studied
natural examples used to analyze the effects of government choices on
innovation. They suggest that the Bayh–Dole Act and its foreign equivalents
have led to increased university patenting and licensing, increased attraction of
industry R&D funding for university research, and increased spinoffs.67
This does not prove, however, that the Bayh–Dole Act actually facilitated
greater technology transfer or greater commercialization of innovations than
otherwise would have occurred.68 There are many reasons why granting

to Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1613, 1641–42 (2009) (analyzing data to evaluate the relationship between the
TRIPS Agreement’s heterogeneous extension of patent terms, given different processing times by field of
technology, and the number of patent counts issued and citations to them, as a proxy for assessing innovation
rates); Bradly J. Condon & Tapen Sinha, Climate Change and Intellectual Property Rights for New Plant
Varieties 17 (Oct. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1944593; B.
Zorina Khan & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Of Patents and Prizes: Great Inventors in Britain and the United States,
1750–1930, at 3–5 (Aug. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.rogerfarmer.com/NewWeb/
testing/AxelConference/Papers/sokoloff.pdf (analyzing natural experiments in patent systems and their effects
on inducing inventive activity by “great inventors”). See generally Jasjeet S. Sekhon & Rocío Titiunik, When
Natural Experiments Are Neither Natural Nor Experiments, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 35 (2012).
66 See, e.g., DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITYINDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES (2004);
Sara Boettiger & Alan B. Bennett, Bayh-Dole: If We Knew Then What We Know Now, 24 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 320 (2006); Loet Leydesdorff & Martin Meyer, The Decline of University Patenting and the
End of the Bayh-Dole Effect, 83 SCIENTOMETRICS 355 (2010); Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for
Developing Countries? Lessons from the US Experience, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 2078, 2079 (2008); Charles R.
McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and Development:
Evaluating the Arguments and Empirical Evidence (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Sch. of Law Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-05-04, 2011).
67 See, e.g., WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32076, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: SELECTED
ISSUES IN PATENT POLICY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY 8–9 (2012); Margo A. Bagley,
Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217,
217–18, 233–34 (2006); David C. Mowery et al., The Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act on U.S. University
Research and Technology Transfer, in INDUSTRIALIZING KNOWLEDGE: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY LINKAGES IN
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 269, 269–70 (Lewis M. Branscomb, Fumio Kodama & Richard Florida eds.,
1999); Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research in the 20th Century: The World Before and
After Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. POL’Y 772, 773 (2006); So et al., supra note 66, at 2079; McManis & Noh, supra
note 66, at 12–19.
68 See, e.g., Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the BayhDole System for Both Developed and Developing Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
311, 378–409 (2009); cf. BUSH, supra note 16, at 31–32 (suggesting that government agencies not require
patenting or assignment of inventions to the government but retain flexibility to compel patent assignments);
Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2207 (2009) (noting “overwhelming”
evidence that university technology transfer activities that have developed in light of the Bayh-Dole Act are
“predominantly patent-centric and revenue driven with a single-minded focus on licensing income and
reimbursement for legal expenses,” resulting in less technology transfer “to many different sectors” than could
otherwise occur).
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intellectual property rights to government grant recipients may have been
inefficient and costly to the public when promoting downstream innovation.
Professor Frischmann has observed that—assuming a patentable invention
results from grant funding—there is unlikely to be an expansive number of
downstream innovations facing impediments to development that require
government intervention. The intellectual property rights limit competition in
the innovation market without reducing production risks, thus enhancing
positive spillovers, hastening or subsidizing the innovation, or adding
information about these concerns. While the grant of rights may facilitate
licensing, it also imposes costs of reduced pre-patent dissemination,
underutilization of the invention, and potential blocking-patent (overlapping
rights) problems. Moreover, “the risk of foreign free-riding” is the primary
impetus justifying continuing government intervention downstream of grant
funding.69
Further, it is widely believed that the Bayh–Dole Act attracted industry
funding at the cost of changing academic norms that affect intrinsic and
extrinsic motivations for basic research.70 The increased level of
commercialization induced by the Bayh–Dole Act is thus sometimes used to
argue for intellectual property rights—particularly patents—noting that
granting private ownership of intellectual property is preferable to retained
government development of the research prospects (at least because of the
private funding inputs that it generates). In contrast, the change in norms is
sometimes used to argue against such rights and to focus on concerns about

69 Frischmann, supra note 14, at 408 n.268; see id. at 407–13 (noting also the limits of domestic firm
efforts at foreign enforcement and arguing that intellectual property is not needed in addition to grant funding
if derivative research is patentable and is less efficient than the alternative of cooperative research—which
enhances private capacity and builds lead-time advantage for derivative innovations—if the derivative research
is not patentable).
70 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 27; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 289; Arti Kaur
Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
77 (1999); cf. Bagley, supra note 67, at 219 n.10 (noting other social costs, including jobs and industrial
research-fund losses from off-shoring university–industry collaborative research); Werner Bönte, What Do
Scientists Think About Commercialization Activities?, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 337, 337–53 (discussing German scientists’ attitudes, identified by a
study of the Max Planck Institute); Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Arti K. Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the Benefits
of State-Sponsored Research: Intellectual Property Rights and Data Sharing in California’s Stem Cell
Initiative, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1187, 1200 (2006) (discussing concerns over restrictions on data and
materials transfers). But see, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights
and the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 (2001).
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anti-commons and other effects that may result from such ownership.71 But
comparatively little analysis has actually been provided regarding whether the
reasons for such increased innovation and commercialization may have more
to do with the comparative internal cultures, expertise, and various motivations
of the actors in private firms, universities, and government agencies, and less
to do with the legal regime allocating rights and regulating the markets.
Institutional culture is notoriously difficult to analyze,72 expertise is hard to
measure,73 and motivation is hard to observe—particularly as it may be
unconscious.74
Moreover, decisions regarding government innovation funding-mechanism
choice may be “idiosyncratic” in that they may not fit within a general
economic framework for comparing means of technology inducement.75 For
example, good analyses of international technology transfer mechanisms are
developing that demonstrate these mechanisms’ complex relationships to, inter
alia, project size, number of projects, trade, foreign direct investment,
intellectual property rights, economic and regulatory environments, human
capital, level of education, R&D funding, natural resources, and patterns of

71 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1084–85 (2008); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca
S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, SCI., May 1998, at
698, 698–99; Kieff, supra note 70, at 692, 704–05; Arti Kaur Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual
Property Rights: A Reply to Kieff, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 707, 710 (2001); see also Jeremy M. Grushcow,
Measuring Secrecy: A Cost of the Patent System Revealed, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 82–83 (2004) (finding that
academic patenting may have delayed research publication, increasing risks of wasteful duplication of
research); cf. Paul A. David, Mitigating “Anticommons” Harms to Research in Science and Technology: New
Moves in “Legal Jujitsu” Against Unintended Adverse Consequences of the Exploitation of Intellectual
Property Rights on Results of Publicly and Privately Funded Research, 2 WIPO J. 59, 62–63 (2010)
(summarizing studies of royalty stacking and other anticommons effects in various industries and scientific
research). See generally MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008).
72 See, e.g., Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 109, 111–12 (1990) (noting
problems of definition, of levels of manifestation—artifacts, values, and underlying assumptions—and of
deciphering content); Linda Smircich, Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis, 28 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
339, 339 (1983) (“The culture concept has been borrowed from anthropology, where there is no consensus on
its meaning. It should be no surprise that there is also variety in its application to organization studies.”). See
generally MARCEL DANESI & PAUL PERRON, ANALYZING CULTURES: AN INTRODUCTION & HANDBOOK
(1999); W. Gibb Dyer Jr., Culture in Organizations: A Case Study and Analysis (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt.,
Working Paper No. 1279-82, 1982).
73 See, e.g., DEVELOPMENT OF PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE: TOWARD MEASUREMENT OF EXPERT
PERFORMANCE AND DESIGN OF OPTIMAL LEARNING ENVIRONMENTS (K. Anders Ericsson ed., 2009).
74 See, e.g., DAVID C. MCCLELLAND, HUMAN MOTIVATION 15–30, 43–48 (1987).
75 Timothy J. Brennan et al., Prizes, Patents, and Technology Procurement: A Proposed Analytical
Framework 6 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 11–21, 2011).
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production.76 But the factors at issue may ultimately be country- and culturespecific.
In summary, we do not know very much yet about important issues that
should inform our decisions. We do not know: what government innovation
choices have actually been made, their results, and their effectiveness across a
number of dimensions; why we have made those choices; how those choices
might compare to alternatives; what factors influence the comparative
effectiveness of those choices; and the extent to which those factors are driven
by particular cultural considerations that may be subject to manipulation. We
also do not know much about how to mediate political disputes or hurdles to
adopting particular choices, which might in turn affect cultural norms and
further inflect comparative effectiveness.
C. The Need for Better Analyses and Three General Proposals to Help
Perform Them
Given the limits to the analyses described above, we desperately need
better analyses of the determinants of the differences in outcomes.77 This likely
may be possible only by carefully analyzing particular institutions and trying to
76 See, e.g., DOMINIQUE FORAY, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER NO. 23,
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE TRIPS AGE: THE NEED FOR NEW TYPES OF PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN THE
LEAST DEVELOPED AND MOST ADVANCED ECONOMIES 4–7 (2009) (providing a typology of technology
transfer and noting limits to transfer by foreign direct investment and infrastructure creation); Gisèle Schmid,
Technology Transfer in the Clean Development Mechanism: The Role of Host Country Characteristics 2–4,
21–22 (Univ. of Geneva Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12021, 2012); Dany Bahar, Ricardo
Hausmann & César A. Hidalgo, International Knowledge Diffusion and the Comparative Advantage of
Nations 4–5 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-020,
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2087607 (noting that knowledge diffusion and technology transfer
may require direct human interactions and identifying a new measure of such diffusion, i.e., the emergence of
new export technologies relative to exports from geographically proximate countries); Lee Branstetter,
Raymond Fisman & C. Fritz Foley, Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Increase International
Technology Transfer? Empirical Evidence from U.S. Firm-Level Data 16–28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 11516, 2005) (analyzing relationships between intellectual property rights, multinational
corporation foreign-affiliate R&D, technology transfers, and R&D spending). See generally KEITH E. MASKUS,
INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER NO. 7, ENCOURAGING INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (2004); Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging
Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109 (1998).
77 I am limiting analysis to innovation outcomes. Measuring overall outcomes of R&D and innovation
policies on society is even more complex. See generally STEVE OLSON & STEPHEN MERRILL, NAT’L ACAD. OF
SCI., MEASURING THE IMPACTS OF FEDERAL INVESTMENTS IN RESEARCH: A WORKSHOP SUMMARY 7–17
(2011) (noting limitations of performance measures for answering policy questions, contingency of such
measures on complementary policies, incompatibility of and tradeoffs among performance measures, and
failure of measurable quantities to capture important outcomes—including the benefits of failures in
redirecting R&D and the inability to capture internal system dynamics in performance measures).
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conduct experiments with comparable institutions where different approaches
are tried simultaneously (recognizing that adequate controls for such
experiments may not exist). Rare natural experiments may sometimes
demonstrate causal effects, but they cannot support analysis of whether
alternatives not chosen would have led to better outcomes. As one commenter
has noted regarding the Bayh–Dole debates, analysis is “inextricably
encumbered by the problem of documenting a counterfactual assertion of the
form: if we had not do[ne] that, the world would now be different.”78 The
analogy here to federalism theory and the need for laboratories of democracy is
apt.79 Moreover, given that the rights and markets at issue may be national or
international in scope,80 it will require both adjustments to domestic laws—
national and subnational laws—as well as amendments to international trade
and intellectual property treaties to permit the necessary international or
domestic segmentation of markets for the needed experimentation to occur.81
A better understanding needs to be developed soon. The current state of
analysis is rudimentary, massive amounts of money will be spent on climate
change and infrastructure innovation, and the outcomes of funding choices are
very important. The three proposals suggested here would help improve
evaluations of such choices and consequently help government decision
making regarding them in the first instance. These proposals are: (1) better
tracking of government-innovation expenditure decisions and their outcomes;
(2) self-conscious and documented legislative and agency decision making

78 Paul A. David, The Economic Logic of “Open Science” and the Balance Between Private Property
Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific Data and Information: A Primer 16 (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy
Research, Discussion Paper No. 02-30, 2003).
79 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
80 Compare, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis,
41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 910–14 (1994) (noting a relatively uniform public and national decision-making
process within the United States), with Robert F. Nagel, The Term Limits Dissent: What Nerve, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 843, 845–47, 855 (1996) (challenging that argument based on the lack of preemptive legislation and
Supreme Court decisions to overturn legislation).
81 I am indebted to Peter Yu for this point, particularly in regard to the need to make adjustments to
national treatment and nondiscrimination obligations under the Government Procurement Agreement. See
Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 4(b), 1915 U.N.T.S. 103 [hereinafter GPA]; cf. S. James Boumil III, Comment, China’s
Indigenous Innovation Policies Under the TRIPS and GPA Agreements and Alternatives for Promoting
Economic Growth, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 755, 773–77 (2012) (discussing TRIPS and GPA concerns with Chinese
indigenous innovation procurement policies). Note that some countries, including the United States, exclude
R&D from their commitments under the GPA. See Appendices and Annexes to the GPA, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/appendices_e.htm (last visited May 12, 2013).
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regarding expenditure form choices; and (3) controlled experiments that go
beyond existing natural experiments.82
Better tracking of the choices of mechanisms for government innovation
expenditures and their outcomes will permit better understanding of how the
money was spent and what innovation outputs resulted. At least since 2008, as
a result of the adoption in 2006 of the Transparency Act,83 U.S. government
agencies have been required to track their awards of at least $25,000. The
reporting targets include procurement contracts, grants, loans, and other
expenditures, and thus include most innovation funding inputs—even if not
broken down as such. Further, this data has been reported electronically, which
permits aggregation and data analysis.84 Government agencies also track their
budget authority for R&D,85 but they rarely track the innovation outputs from
such inputs in a manner that would permit comparative analysis.
The most extensive data on R&D and innovation funding by government is
compiled by the National Science Foundation (NSF) through its Federal Funds
Survey.86 This survey data provides funding input information reported by
government agencies by type of performer (i.e., the organization doing the
work) and plant (i.e., facilities), but does not include clandestine R&D, is not
verified outside the reporting agency, contains estimates that are encouraged
where actual data is not available, and (most significantly) does not contain
relevant output measures.87 These surveys lack numerous details, are provided
after the fact, may not separate research from development, and may not be

82 Cf. Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 657, 676–77 (2010) (discussing a three-pronged approach to implement an Institutional Analysis and
Development framework, which includes a taxomony of practices, the identification of variables, and
preserving flexibility of reponses).
83 Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-282, 120 Stat. 1186
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 6101 (2006)).
84 The compiled data is made available to the public at USASPENDING.GOV, http://www.usaspending.gov/
(last visited May 12, 2013).
85 See, e.g., OMB 2013 Budget Report, supra note 56, at 370–71.
86 See Survey of Federal Funds for Research and Development, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., http://www.nsf.gov/
statistics/srvyfedfunds/ (last visited May 12, 2013) [hereinafter NSF Survey]; see also Federal Funds for R&D,
NAT’L SCI. FOUND., http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/fedfunds/ (last visited May 12, 2013) (tracking budget
obligations).
87 See NSF Survey, supra note 86; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND
INNOVATION INDICATORS: REPORT OF A WORKSHOP 3 (Ronald S. Cooper & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 1997)
(noting the difficulty of measuring innovation outputs).

SARNOFF GALLEYSPROOFS1

2013]

GOVERNMENT CHOICES IN INNOVATION FUNDING

6/11/2013 9:03 AM

1109

able to be accessed except at aggregate levels due to confidentiality concerns,
which precludes policy analysis in real time.88
In contrast, some recent efforts are being developed by federal agencies to
track and measure the innovation outputs of federal funding inputs, although
participation in reporting is currently voluntary.89 Further, some voluntarily
reported innovation output data—on product creation, organizational creation
(startups), intellectual property filings and grants, and licensing formation and
revenue—is compiled annually by the Association of University Technology
Managers (AUTM).90 This data is collected from U.S. and Canadian
institutions—principally universities, colleges, and hospitals, but also a few
national laboratories and third-party technology investment firms—and
includes government research funding inputs.91 However, such data is not
mandatory or subject to confirmation and does not include much important
information regarding outputs (e.g., patent licensing efforts and license
terms).92 Thus, data on licensing and other transfers of technology may not be
available and must be estimated, both in these countries and worldwide.93 As
others have noted, moreover, the lack of such data may significantly affect the
marketability of the technologies.94
Some power to compel reporting of innovation outputs (including licensing
activity and terms) already exists for federally funded research subject to the

88

See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DATA NEEDS: PROCEEDINGS OF

A WORKSHOP 3, 7, 12, 15 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2005).
89 See What is Star Metrics?, STAR METRICS, https://www.starmetrics.nih.gov/

(last visited May 12,
2013) (noting various innovation output measures that include job creation, scientific knowledge measures
such as publications and citations, social outcome measures such as health outcomes and environmental
impacts, workforce outcome measures such as student mobility and employment, and economic growth
measures such as patents and start-ups). The STAR METRICS effort—Science and Technology for America’s
Reinvestment: Measuring the Effect of Research on Innovation, Competitiveness and Science—is led by the
National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy. Id.
90 See, e.g., AUTM Licensing Activity Survey: FY2011, ASS’N U. TECH. MANAGERS, http://www.autm.
net/FY_2011_Licensing_Activity_Survey/8730.htm (last visited May 12, 2013).
91 See, e.g., id.; see also Richard A. Jensen, Startup Firms from Research in U.S. Universities, in
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 273, 273–76 (analyzing
AUTM data from 1993–2004 and noting other studies using AUTM data).
92 See, e.g., AUTM U.S. Survey, supra note 90.
93 See, e.g., Harhoff, supra note 41, at 60 (discussing various estimates of world markets for technology,
including royalty and licensing revenues, sales of patent rights, and effects of transfer pricing).
94 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV.
257, 258 (2007) (noting that “publication of patent assignment and license terms” would make a huge
difference to developing markets for patents).
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Bayh–Dole Act.95 In addition to the statutorily required reporting obligations
that assure disclosures of inventions and related patenting activities,96 implicit
authority likely exists to require disclosures of licensing efforts and terms to
determine whether to exercise march-in rights or use the statutory license
authority.97 Additional power to compel disclosures of federally funded
innovation outputs or federally granted intellectual property rights could
readily be created by new legislation without triggering any concern for
regulatory takings (and certainly not if done prospectively). As noted in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,98 federal benefits may be conditioned on the
disclosure of trade secrets, and no compensable taking occurs when a private
party agrees to accept the benefits with such conditions.99 Of course, such
legislation could protect trade secrecy while permitting useful data gathering
and analysis.
By creating requirements for affirmative and intentional government
choices and reporting regarding these mechanisms (and assuming honest
disclosures), the reasons why the money went to the specific inputs can be
known. This may help both to avoid automatic default to potentially costly and
relatively ineffective “business as usual” approaches and allow for
commencement of the process of analyzing the fit—or lack thereof—between
decisions and outcomes. The premise of an extensive environmental literature
regarding impact statements is that requiring ex ante consideration of
alternatives leads to better decision making and policy outcomes.100

95

See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1), (5) (2006).
Id.
97 35 U.S.C. §§ 202(c)(4), 203 (2006); cf. MATTHEW RIMMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE
CHANGE: INVENTING CLEAN TECHNOLOGIES 283 (2011) (citing Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Comment,
Addressing the Green Patent Global Deadlock Through Bayh-Dole Reform, 119 YALE L.J. 1727 (2010))
(noting the ability to change patenting and licensing defaults and the terms of access for federally funded
technologies).
98 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
99 See id. at 1007–08. So long as the trade secret rights are not destroyed, the information should retain
substantial value and thus should not result in a regulatory taking even if the requirement for disclosure of
information to the government is imposed retroactively. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S.
528, 539 (2005) (“[T]he complete elimination of a property's value is the determinative factor.”); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (noting that Supreme Court cases “uniformly reject
the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a ‘taking’”).
100 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (2006)); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,
349 (1989); cf. Mark Squillace & Alexander Hood, NEPA, Climate Change, and Public Lands Decision
Making, 42 ENVTL. L. 469, 481–85, 510–25 (2012) (discussing the need for quantitation and pricing of outputs
to permit cumulative impacts assessment in regard to federal land’s greenhouse gas emissions, and proposing
96
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Some analysts have noted the need for better decision making and
management within government energy innovation institutions by clarifying
their mission, attracting better leadership, “cultivating an entrepreneurial and
competitive culture[,] setting up a structure and management system that
balances independence and accountability[,] and ensuring stable, predictable
funding.”101 They have also noted that predictable, long-term funding will
permit greater experimentation with alternative research pathways,102 and they
have identified the lack of fit between institutions that make R&D decisions
and incentives for commercial deployment of technologies.103 Perhaps most
importantly, they have acknowledged that for the types of government funding
directed at the private sector “there is no apparent rationale or strategy behind
the choices made regarding what type of relationships . . . should be used in
different cases . . . [and] DOE documents show no evidence of any high-level
analysis or planning for optimizing interactions with the private sector.”104
This is simply shocking, given both the amount of money at issue and the
needs that such funding is supposed to address. It will only get worse if
extrapolated beyond the United States and the energy context to global efforts
to address climate change.
Finally, creating various non-natural experiments may provide
understanding as to what works better, when, and why. Such “controlled
environment” experiments can help reveal which approaches perform better in
particular, comparative circumstances.105 Significantly, such better
understanding will require multiple kinds of experiments employing different
funding mechanisms in different national and institutional cultures to develop a
meaningful body of information to analyze. To do so may sometimes require
segmentation of markets within international regions or particular nations,
which in turn may require amending treaty laws to permit restriction of

rules to hold agencies more accountable). See generally SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK:
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1984).
101 ANADON ET AL., supra note 34, at 2; see Mark Radka, Some Perspectives About the Climate
Technology Centre/Climate Technology Network, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION CLIMATE
CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/some_perspectives_
about_the_ctc_ctn.pdf (last visited May 12, 2013) (discussing ten similar factors that lead to successful
technology centers).
102 See, e.g., ANADON ET AL., supra note 34, at 2.
103 See, e.g., id. at 1–2.
104 Id. at 3.
105 Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The Effects of Economic Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 36, at 1449, 1461; see id. at 1461–62 (discussing different types of
controlled experiments).
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government funding to regional or domestic private entities.106 In particular,
these experiments might measure both the timing and quality of the innovation
outputs induced by various types of funding mechanisms chosen for the
different markets.
Creating these types of national or subnational experiments, moreover, will
not necessarily conflict with efforts to promote substantive harmonization of
“best practices” for the content of national laws within the World Trade
Organization (WTO) TRIPS regime,107 the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) treaty complex,108 or other intergovernmental fora. An
inadequate theoretical understanding exists regarding optimal intellectual
property and other innovation-related laws. Much of the current international
effort at harmonization either reproduces the default to untested beliefs in
greater reliance on either private markets or government regulation, or reflects
the exercise of raw political power and trade efforts to promote comparative
national advantages.109 Accordingly, the proposed experimentation may
actually promote harmonization by providing reasons to harmonize at
particular levels of national law protection.110
106 Intellectual property rights are based on national laws, whereas relevant product markets may be
international in scope. Although some experiments may therefore permit private entities to compete for both
national rights and international markets for intermediate and ultimate innovation outputs, such winner-take-all
experiments may hide useful information regarding comparative effectiveness. Accordingly, by segmenting
markets, different approaches can be tried simultaneously. Of course, such segmented markets may sometimes
not reach sufficient scale to induce the desired innovation outputs. Careful thought will therefore be needed
regarding how to design useful, non-natural experiments.
107 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement].
108 See, e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as revised at
Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
109 See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 42–45 (2004). See generally SUSAN K.
SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003).
110 There is an extensive but highly contested economic, corporate, financial, environmental, public
choice, international relations, and constitutional literature on federalism and race-to-the-bottom and race-tothe-top effects of competitive experimentation within or across jurisdictions. This literature bears citation but
not elaboration here. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race”
and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental
Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 629–33 (1996); Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local
Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76
VA. L. REV. 265, 274–90 (1990); Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among
Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988); Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1213–21, 1239–53 (1992); Sarnoff, Continuing
Imperative, supra note 57, at 278–85; Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International
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Even if domestic laws are adopted and international treaties are modified to
permit these proposals for tracking, decision-making documentation, and
experimentation, it may still be difficult to disentangle the relationships among
government funding choices, comparative outcomes, institutional and national
cultural considerations, and simple fortuity or serendipity.111 In the end, the
choices may have to be “muddle[d] through” based on inadequate theoretical
and empirical guidance, a limited set of values, and historic experiences.112
The next Part of this Article provides a classification of government
choices of innovation funding mechanisms. The classification is admittedly
idiosyncratic, but it has the benefit of clearly highlighting the possible major
differences of approach and the substantial similarities among approaches
across a number of dimensions. Legislators, administrators, and law treaty
negotiators and implementers may want to pay particular attention to the broad
range of options the next Part describes, in order to avoid conceptual default to
a narrower set of options that may be less effective. Many options may require
the creation of new institutions or bureaucracies, or the adaptation of existing
institutions and bureaucracies for effective implementation. Critically,
understanding the choices may generate the recognition that path dependence
is not inevitable.113
Before turning to the classification, it bears noting that efforts to better
understand how to effectively promote technology development and transfer to

Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2059 (1993); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to
Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. (SYMPOSIUM ISSUE) 67, 75, 80–87 (1996); Tiebout, supra note 62; see also Daniel B. Rodriguez,
Turning Federalism Inside Out: Intrastate Aspects of Interstate Regulatory Competition, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. (SYMPOSIUM ISSUE) 149, 151–52 (1996) (noting in-state differences that affect racing); Stewart, supra
note 57, at 1211 & n.65 (describing the race to the bottom as a manifestation of the “Tragedy of the
Commons”).
111 Cf. Madison et al., supra note 82, at 680 (identifying the goal of commons-based analysis as
determining success or failure as a function of context).
112 Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959); see also
Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 517 (1979).
113 Cf. Tomain, supra note 53, at 396 (arguing that “[b]ecause clean energy and climate change present
categorically different regulatory challenges, the regulatory responses must also be categorically different as
well”); see also id. at 399–400 (discussing how firms’ “locked-in” needs to recoup investments, organizational
culture, and path-dependent commitments to past forms of investment and business decisions tend toward
incremental advances rather than new and creative innovation).
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address climate change may not fully address the serious fiscal constraints that
exist and the distributional justice and other moral and ethical concerns114 that
will continue to affect such activities.115 As has previously been noted,
financial constraints dramatically affected technology development,
substitution, and transfer obligations to developing countries under the
Montreal Protocol.116
Efforts at acquiring substitute technology [have] not been successful
as the technologies are covered by IPRs [intellectual property rights],
and are inaccessible either on account of the high price quoted by the
technology suppliers and/or due to the conditions laid down by the
suppliers. This would require domestically owned firms to give up
their majority equity holding through joint ventures or to agree to
export restrictions in order to gain access to the alternative
technology.
Financial assistance towards the acquisition of such technology
has also not been effective. In fact, an interim progress report by the
Executive Committee on technology transfer stated that the terms of
freely negotiated transfer of technologies, including costs such as
patents, designs and royalties, may not always be accommodated by
the funding policies of the Multilateral Fund. Thus, while prices of
alternative technologies are unaffordable on account of IPRs, access
to these is limited due to inadequate funds domestically and lack of
financial assistance from the Multilateral Fund, creating a major

114 See, e.g., INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROTECTING
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CLIMATE-CONSTRAINED WORLD 19–32 (2011), available at http://www.ichrp.org/files/
reports/65/138_ichrp_climate_tech_transfer_report.pdf; Thomas Alured Faunce & Hitoshi Nasu, Normative
Foundations of Technology Transfer and Transnational Benefit Principles in the UNESCO Universal
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 34 J. MED. & PHIL. 296 (2009).
115 See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 978 (2012) (arguing that intellectual property rights are “in significant
tension with distributive values” because they use “price to ration access to information goods” and “the
existing distribution of resources may be unjust”); Stiglitz, supra note 38, at 1697 (“[F]inancing research
through monopoly profits may be neither the most efficient nor the most equitable way of doing so.”); id. at
1715 (“[Intellectual property rights] will (effectively) recognize differences in elasticities of demand (because
the monopolist can extract more profits when demand is less elastic), but not any other circumstances, and
therefore inherently represents an inequitable way of financing research. The bottom line is that raising
revenues for financing research through the granting of monopoly power cannot be justified by any generally
accepted principles of public finance.”).
116 See Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer arts. 10, 10A, Sept 16, 1987, 1522
U.N.T.S. 3.
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hurdle in transiting to ODS [ozone depleting substance] friendly
117
production, especially among producer nations.

These concerns will be correspondingly greater for climate-change mitigation
and adaptation than for stratospheric ozone protection, as the number of
technologies implicated for development and transfer—whether already in the
public domain,118 owned by many companies that are willing to sell at
reasonable prices under reasonable conditions,119 or owned by companies that
are unwilling to transfer them except at high costs or on unreasonable
conditions120—and the costs associated with them will be substantially larger.
These distributional and ethical concerns will be further exacerbated by
existing (and likely future skewed and clustered)121 national patterns of clean
technology development, patenting, and ownership.122
117 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES OF MULTILATERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A PACKAGE OF TRADE MEASURES AND POSITIVE MEASURES 45–46 (Veena
Jha & Ulrich Hoffmann eds., 2000); see also MARTIN KHOR, IPRS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND CLIMATE
CHANGE 4–6 (2009), available at www.un.org/esa/policy/devplan/egm_climatechange/khor.pdf; Sarnoff,
supra note 54, at 326–27. See generally STEPHEN O. ANDERSEN ET AL., TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR THE
OZONE LAYER: LESSONS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE (2007).
118 See, e.g., JOHN H. BARTON, CHATHAM HOUSE, ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME PAPER 08/02, MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE THROUGH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: ADDRESSING
THE NEEDS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2008) (discussing the transfer of existing transportation
technologies).
119 See, e.g., JOHN H. BARTON, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER NO. 2,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AN
ANALYSIS OF SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC, BIOFUEL AND WIND TECHNOLOGIES 11–14 (2007) (discussing renewable
energy technologies).
120 See, e.g., supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text (discussing ozone depletion technologies).
Breakthrough climate change mitigation or adaptation technologies, such as carbon capture and some
renewable energy technologies, would likely be subject to intellectual property rights and have few meaningful
substitutes. Cf. LEE ET AL., supra note 5, at 21–43 (comparing patent landscapes of various renewable energy
and carbon capture technologies); Tomain, supra note 53, at 390–91 (discussing the current costs of carbon
capture given existing technologies); Mohammed Al-Juaied & Adam Whitmore, Realistic Costs of Carbon
Capture (Belfer Ctr. for Sci. & Int’l Affairs, Discussion Paper 2009-08, 2009), available at http://belfercenter.
ksg.harvard.edu/files/2009_AlJuaied_Whitmore_Realistic_Costs_of_Carbon_Capture_web.pdf. Developing
breakthrough technologies also may be a more efficient international regulatory strategy than treaty regimes
focused on emissions reduction. See, e.g., Scott Barrett, Climate Treaties and “Breakthrough” Technologies,
96 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 22 (2006).
121 See MICHAEL E. PORTER, CLUSTERS OF INNOVATION: REGIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF U.S.
COMPETITIVENESS (2001); JONATHAN SALLET ET AL., SCI. PROGRESS, THE GEOGRAPHY OF INNOVATION: THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE GROWTH OF REGIONAL INNOVATION CLUSTERS 1 (2009), available at
http://www.scienceprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/eda_paper.pdf; Mercedes Delgado et al.,
Clusters, Convergence, and Economic Performance 1 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.isc.hbs.edu/pdf/DPS_ClustersPerformance_08-20-10.pdf; see also Pontus Braunerhjelm,
Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Economic Growth: Interdependencies, Irregularities and Regularities, in
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 161, 185–93; Maryann
P. Feldman & Gil Avnimelech, Knowledge Spillovers and the Geography of Innovation—Revisited: A 20
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II. A TAXONOMY OF GOVERNMENT INNOVATION FUNDING MECHANISMS
Using a broad brush for classification, government choices to fund
innovation can be grouped into five categories: (a) subsidization; (b)
procurement; (c) direct development; (d) constructed commons; and (e)
product, process, and market regulation.123 In 2000, one American professor
identified five categories of choices that are somewhat narrower but overlap in
large part those just described: reliance on the “naked market”; markets and
intellectual property rights; markets and R&D tax incentives; subsidies; and
procurement.124 In 2001, another American professor identified five slightly
different categories of government innovation-funding action: direct
development of technology; subsidization of private entities (particularly of
university research); post hoc prizes or other rewards; government laws that
assist concealment of private information; and conferring intellectual property
rights.125 In 2008, a Nobel Prize winning economist supplied a three-part

Years’ Perspective on the Field on Geography of Innovation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION
note 36, at 150; Alessandra Fogli & Laura Veldkamp, Germs, Social Networks
and Growth 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18470, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1679857 (discussing effects and persistence of historic
social structures on productivity). See generally CHARLES W. WESSNER, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
GROWING INNOVATION CLUSTERS FOR AMERICAN PROSPERITY: SUMMARY OF A SYMPOSIUM (2011); Daniel
Gervais, Of Clusters and Assumptions: Innovation as Part of a Full TRIPS Implementation, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2353, 2363–69 (2009).
122 See Sarnoff, supra note 54, at 318–19 (citing, inter alia, ANTOINE DECHEZLEPRÊTRE ET AL.,
INVENTION AND TRANSFER OF CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES ON A GLOBAL SCALE: A STUDY
DRAWING ON PATENT DATA 4 (2008); INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., PATENTS AND CLEAN
ENERGY: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN EVIDENCE AND POLICY 9, 30–36 (2010)). However, counterpressures
may be exerted from developed countries that find their technology development restricted by foreign patents.
See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Inverse Enclosure: Abdicating the Green Technology Landscape, 49 AM. BUS. L.J.
805 (2012).
123 Cf. Madison et al., supra note 82, at 667 (discussing “direct or indirect provisioning by the public
sector using a combination of grants to researchers; tax credits or subsidies to researchers and enterprises that
employ them; prizes; and production and distribution of knowledge and innovation by the government . . . by
organizing research enterprises or by purchasing and distributing private research”). Another recent
classification and comparative analysis discussed five “public innovation policies,” which are: intellectual
property rights; R&D subsidies; tax incentives; prizes and contests; and public procurement and production.
See Tuomas Takalo, Rationales and Instruments for Public Innovation Policies 10–19 (Bank of Finland
Research Discussion Papers, Paper No. 1, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2217502 (discussing each category and tradeoffs of the various approaches).
124 See Frischmann, supra note 14, at 354; cf. id. at 387 (lumping government direct development with
subsidization). In regard to procurement, the government both creates a new market for innovation and acts in
a double role within that market, as a purchaser on behalf of the pubic and as an investor. See id. at 374 n.102.
125 See William Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical, Empirical, and Historical
Perspectives 2–3 (May 2, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/
Innovation.pdf.
AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra
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categorization—patents, prizes, and government-funded research—and
focused on six attributes of these three choices: selection of research targets;
financing methods; dissemination incentives; nature of the risks; innovation
incentives; and transaction costs.126 More recently, another American professor
focused on a two-part basic categorization of “indirect subsidies through tax
expenditure or market regulation through other tax policies, or direct spending
on innovation either through direct employment or through a system of grants,
rewards or prizes for creators and inventors.”127
The categories I have chosen emphasize what I believe are the
fundamentally different approaches to funding innovation and cover a broader
range of subsidies and market regulation measures than are found in most other
categorization schemes. The categorization may also help demonstrate the
similarities and differences among the various approaches. As discussed
further below, specific measures within these categories could fall into
multiple categories, and thus the choices of “location”—for describing various
measures within the various categories—are both idiosyncratic and not
mutually exclusive. Definitional problems affect categorization, and the
multiplicity of mechanisms that can be and are used makes any categorization
scheme necessarily somewhat arbitrary and likely incomplete.128 Further, it
bears emphasizing that adopting multiple simultaneous approaches risks
wasting limited government resources on ineffective efforts to promote
innovation and on over-rewarding investors and private firms at the public’s
expense.129 But it certainly helps to recognize the diversity of choices so as to
improve analyses of their effects and make more informed collective decisions.
A. Subsidies
Subsidization is a very broad class that has different comparative effects on
innovation.130 The most basic form of subsidy to R&D and innovation is (1)
direct and targeted subsidization of R&D and innovation efforts, such as
government agency funding of university, corporate, or small business R&D,

126

See Stiglitz, supra, note 38, at 1722.
Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property
Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1368 (2009).
128 See Jerome S. Gabig, Jr., Federal Research Grants: Who Owns the Intellectual Property?, 9 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 640 (1986).
129 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 385.
130 See OECD, NATIONAL SYSTEMS FOR FINANCING INNOVATION 11–12 (1995).
127
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and government support for education more broadly.131 Other subsidies
include: (2) prizes, rewards, and other ex post funding; (3) consumption or
production subsidies; (4) tax subsidies; (5) administrative subsidies; and (6)
foreign aid.
1. Direct Subsidies
Direct subsidy funds may be provided through direct agreements,
cooperative research agreements, and other funding vehicles.132 They are
typically provided ex ante without regard to whether they generate any specific
kind or amount of innovation.133 But direct subsidy funds potentially can be
provided (usually in predetermined amounts) ex post to R&D and innovation
efforts and may be conditioned upon generating particular outputs or quantities
of outputs. If provided ex post and conditionally, such direct subsidies look
much like prizes—the next type of subsidy mechanism. Similarly, direct
subsidies to R&D or innovation may look a lot like procurement of R&D or
innovation that is not linked to procurement of subsequent products.134 As with
procurement, such subsidies may fail to result in the anticipated R&D or
innovation outputs, or they may be made conditional upon achieving ultimate
outputs or on achieving intermediate outputs (as with progress payments).

131 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 387 (noting subsidies to nonprofit institutions and, less
frequently, to private firms, and discussing development of reasons for such funding through political
processes, expert bureaucracies, and solicitations from researchers).
132 See id. at 388 & nn.178, 183 (noting that direct subsidies include cash assistance, loans, loan
guarantees, and insurance, and that cooperative agreements—rather than grants—are to be used for greater
government involvement in the innovation R&D).
133 See Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, § 2, 100 Stat. 1785, 1785–87
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3710a (2006)) (permitting Cooperative R&D Agreements (CRADAs) to
allow government laboratories to negotiate licenses for use of government-owned inventions and to create a
consortium for technology transfer); cf. Frischmann, supra note 14, at 367 (discussing a dynamic model of
innovation that requires multiple passes of investments and noting the ability to reach an “innovative leap” in
“numerous steps that can be divided into smaller increments for purposes of investigation, [permitting] the
costs of research [to] become unbundled”); id. at 387 (noting that government bears the risk of unsuccessful
efforts and foreign misappropriation from subsidies, providing a basis for developing CRADAs to share these
risks).
134 Cf. 41 U.S.C. §§ 405, 421(c)(1) (2006) (granting authority for the Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FAR)); Frischmann, supra note 14, at 388 (noting that grants and procurement are distinguished principally
by the functional relationship of the parties, the innovation outputs targeted⎯on the spectrum from basic to
applied research⎯and whether the FAR are applicable).
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2. Prizes, Rewards, and Other Ex Post Funding
The next set of mechanisms includes prizes, rewards, and other ex post
R&D or innovation funding. These mechanisms (that I will collectively call
prizes) are typically conditioned on generating specific innovation outputs or
quantities of them. Prizes may provide hortatory recognition,135 or financial
incentives for R&D by promising ex ante, predetermined amounts, or ex ante
uncertain but ex post innovation-generation-specified amounts.136 Some forms
of government hortatory recognition (e.g., certifications), particularly when
based on achieving particular output or quality levels for goods or services in
markets, are treated under the market regulation category below.
3. Consumption and Production Subsidies
The next set of subsidy mechanisms is consumption or production
subsidies, which include direct subsidies, feed-in tariffs,137 loan guarantees,
135

See, e.g., Patents for Humanity, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_
events/patents_for_humanity.jsp (last modified Dec. 6, 2012) (creating an award competition providing public
recognition and accelerated patent examination—a form of administrative subsidy⎯for using patented
technology to advance “humanitarian challenges” in the fields of medical technology, food and nutrition, clean
technology, and information technology).
136 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 119–70 (2003)
(discussing features of patent-prize systems, providing reasons why imperfect decision making should not be a
bar to their adoption, and reviewing earlier proposals and their limitations); see also id. at 171–93 (discussing
two additional roles of patents that prizes do not address—commercialization of inventions and screening of
patent validity—and two additional problems with patents that prizes may address—common pool patent races
and inventing around activity); Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to
Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2011); Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent
Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305 (1992); James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of
New Medicines and Vaccines, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 155 (2009); Michael Polanvyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV.
ECON. STUD. 61 (1944); cf. Gregory N. Mandel, When to Open Infrastructure Access, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 205,
206–08 (2008) [hereinafter Mandel, When to Open Infrastructure] (discussing patent rewards⎯a form of prize
where the government buys out an inventor’s patent rights and makes them available to the public⎯that can
act like open-access policies that do not permit price discrimination among uses and users, without
diminishing ex ante innovation incentives); Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation with
Intellectual Property Innovation: A New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 51,
64–67 (2005) (discussing benefits of rewards—including the reduction of deadweight losses, waste in
inventing around patents, and licensing costs and thicket risks— noting existing methods of assessing social
value of patents, and reciting four main criticisms of rewards: (1) failure to incentivize commercialization; (2)
failure to provide incentives for fixed costs; (3) failure of opt-in systems to weed out bad patents; and (4) costs
of administration).
137 See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and Complementary
Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 233 (2012) (discussing use of feed-in tariffs or production subsidies to
address economies-of-scale market failures); David M. Driesen, Climate Disruption: An Economic Dynamic
Approach, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,639, 10,645 (2012) (noting that feed-in tariffs sometimes require purchases at
above-market prices); Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Judge Cudahy and the Deference Tension in United States
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and various kinds of credits. Consumption and production subsidies provide
incentives to engage in R&D and innovation but normally are supplied
conditionally and ex post to its outputs. The promise of these subsidies
provides ex ante incentives to innovate, as well as to potentially fund further
R&D within the same production firms (or allows consumers to redirect funds
to R&D). However, because it is not tied directly to the R&D or innovation
output (like direct subsidies or prizes), the potential of consumption or
production subsidies to induce R&D and innovation is even more uncertain.
4. Tax Subsidies
Yet another set of subsidies is narrow or broad tax subsidies, which are
distinguished from the direct transfer of funds to R&D, production, or
consumption. Tax subsidies, like direct subsidies, may apply to basic and
applied R&D expenditures, production, or consumption. Given that tax
subsidies have value only in regard to taxable income, they are effective
principally regarding commercial R&D and innovations.138 However, not-forprofit R&D engaged in by tax-exempt entities reflects an implicit but
untargeted tax subsidy to such innovation.
Tax subsidies can be supplied as tax credits, expense deductions, cost
allowances from taxable income, depreciation and amortization allowances,
differential tax rates, refunds, or carryovers.139 They may apply to all
expenditures or only to incremental ones above specified thresholds. They may
also be used to attract foreign R&D and innovation investments by reducing
relative costs of R&D in particular jurisdictions.140 Thus, tax subsidies may be
Energy Law, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 371, 382 (2012) (discussing use of feed-in tariffs or required purchases to
promote project development). See generally KARLYNN CORY ET AL., FEED-IN TARIFF POLICY: DESIGN,
IMPLEMENTATION, AND RPS POLICY INTERACTIONS (2009).
138 See, e.g., Harhoff, supra note 41, at 57 (discussing different types of firms’ comparative benefits from
tax expensing compared to carry-forwards of R&D and intangibles).
139 For a discussion on tax credits and deductions, see LAURA TYSON & GREG LINDEN, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, THE CORPORATE R&D TAX CREDIT AND U.S. INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS: GAUGING THE
ECONOMIC AND FISCAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CREDIT 21–22 (2012).
140 See id. at 22–24; see also 15 U.S.C. § 638 (2006) (Small Business Innovation Research Program); 26
U.S.C. §§ 41, 174 (2006) (providing for the Research & Experimentation Tax Credit and the Research and
Experimental Expenditures Deduction, respectively); Small Business Technology Transfer Program
Reauthorization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-50, 115 Stat. 263 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 638, 657
(2006)); OECD, R&D TAX INCENTIVES: RATIONALE, DESIGN, EVALUATION 4–8 (2010), available at
http://www.oecd.org/sti/industryandglobalisation/46352862.pdf; TYSON & LINDEN, supra note 139, at 2
(noting that the R&D tax credit is one of the largest federal tax expenditures, and that it has repeatedly lapsed
and been restored retroactively); JACEK WARDA, OECD, R&D TAX TREATMENT IN OCED COUNTRIES:
COMPARISONS AND EVALUATIONS (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/science/innovationinscience
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tied more or less closely to the R&D activities or innovation outputs sought to
be promoted, and therefore may vary regarding their stimulus to innovation.
Further, they add uncertainty because potential recipients must assess ex ante
the value of the perceived tax benefits for motivating R&D decisions.141
Contrary to some earlier evidence suggesting that direct subsidies may
substitute for corporate manufacturing-sector innovation funding whereas tax
subsidies may induce greater expenditures,142 some recent evidence suggests
that tax subsidies may be less effective than direct government subsidies for
certain small- or medium-sized entities; tax subsidies may act as complements
rather than as substitutes for inducing private R&D and innovation.143
5. Administrative Subsidies
There are also various forms of “administrative” subsidies, which can
reduce the costs or increase the benefits obtained by private entities engaged in
R&D or innovation in their interactions with the government. These cost
reductions or benefit enhancements also act as an incentive to induce ex ante
innovation, but may be more uncertain in regard to the conditions of their
supply or the amount of benefit they provide. Exemplary administrative

technologyandindustry/40024456.pdf; Praveen Goyal, The Future of the Canada–United States Relationship—
Innovation and Technology, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Canada–United States Law Institute
Conference on An Example of Cooperation and Common Cause: Enhancing Canada–United States Security
and Prosperity Through the Great Lakes and North American Trade (Apr. 2–4, 2009), in 34 CAN.-U.S. L.J.
107, 115–16 (2010) (comparing foreign investment attractiveness of U.S. tax credits that are contingent on
appropriations with Canadian tax credits against across-the-board taxes that are not contingent); cf. Preston
Manning & Jack Mintz, Implications of the Recommendations of the Expert Panel on Federal Support to
Research and Development 4 (Univ. of Calgary Sch. of Pub. Policy SPP Research Papers, Research Paper No.
12-7, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2028124 (noting that Canada is
second after Spain among large industrialized countries in federal and provincial tax support to innovation, but
nevertheless has a “relatively low rate of business research and development activity”). See generally BD. ON
SCI., TECH., & ECON. POLICY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BORDERLINE CASE: INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY,
CORPORATE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND INVESTMENT (James M. Poterba ed., 1997); Consuelo Lauda
Kertz & James K. Hasson, Jr., University Research and Development Activities: The Federal Income Tax
Consequences of Research Contracts, Research Subsidiaries and Joint Ventures, 13 J.C. & U.L. 109 (1986);
Bronwyn H. Hall, Tax Incentives for Innovation in the United States: A Report to the European Union (Jan.
15, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/BHH01%20EU%20
Report%20USA%20rtax.pdf.
141 Cf. Frischmann, supra note 14, at 394–95 (noting that tax incentives are effective to the extent they are
targeted at a cognizable class of innovations, and that “where the government has sufficient information or
where cooperative arrangements can be structured . . . direct government funding may be [more] appropriate”).
142 See, e.g., Theofanis P. Mamuneas & M. Ishaq Nadiri, Public R&D Policies and Cost Behavior of the
US Manufacturing Industries 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5059, 1995).
143 See, e.g., Isabel Busom et al., Tax Incentives or Subsidies for R&D? 4–5 (Maastricht Econ. & Soc.
Research Inst. on Innovation & Tech., Working Paper No. 2012-056, 2012).
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subsidies include reduced costs of applying for intellectual property rights and
faster processing of applications for such rights.144 The reduced costs may thus
be contingent on innovation outputs and either may not be perceived as a
significant ex ante inducement or may not be cycled back into additional R&D
efforts. The benefits of earlier protection may depend on uncertain or ex ante
unperceived market conditions that will occur in the future. Such subsidies,
moreover, may be provided in the form of extraordinary rewards to particular
innovation outputs, and the amount of the administrative subsidy could readily
exceed any realistic measure of its innovation-inducing potential. For example,
serious consideration was given to providing “wild-card” extensions to
unrelated patent terms for producing certain medical innovations.145 To the
extent they provide rewards in excess of R&D and innovation costs, such
subsidies look more like prizes.
6. Foreign Aid
Finally, foreign aid may be thought of as a subsidy to R&D and innovation.
Foreign aid can include financing, expertise, and other assistance given
directly or through intergovernmental organizations, provided either to the
recipient jurisdiction’s government or its private sector. Foreign aid can target
R&D directly or indirectly through subsidized consumption or production,146
and may be given conditionally or unconditionally to achieve particular

144 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 41(h) (2006) (providing reduced patent prosecution fees for small business
concerns); Estelle Derclaye, Not Only Innovation but Also Collaboration, Funding, Goodwill and
Commitment: Which Role for Patent Laws in Post-Copenhagen Climate Change Action, 9 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 657, 659, 670–71 (2010) (proposing for green patents accelerated examination, reduction,
cancellation, or waiver of fees, removal of green inventions from deferred examination, earlier publication
and/or priority at the opposition and infringement stages, and stronger protection, and also describing the
Green Tech pilot program); Green Technology Pilot Program—CLOSED, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/green_tech.jsp (last modified May 7, 2012). See generally ANTOINE
DECHEZLEPRÊTRE, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER NO. 37, FAST-TRACKING GREEN
PATENT APPLICATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (2013), available at http://ictsd.org/i/publications/154732/.
145 See, e.g., Jorn Sonderholm, Wild-Card Patent Extensions as a Means to Incentivize Research and
Development of Antibiotics, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 240, 241 (2009) (discussing such proposals); B. Spellberg
et al., Societal Costs Versus Savings from Wild-Card Patent Extension Legislation to Spur Critically Needed
Antibiotic Development, 35 INFECTION 167 (2007) (modeling the costs and benefits and suggesting costneutrality within ten years after marketing approval of the induced innovation); cf. Amy Kapczynski,
Commentary, Innovation Policy for a New Era, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 264, 265–66 (2009) (criticizing such
proposals for delinking the reward from the value of the innovation, eliminating flexibility in determining the
reward, and hiding the true costs of the reward from the public).
146 See WORLD BANK, THE CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM: ACCELERATING CLIMATE INNOVATION IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3–4 (n.d.), available at http://www.infodev.org/en/Publication.1152.html.
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innovation outputs or amounts.147 Of course, foreign aid to research may
ultimately result in higher costs of purchasing research outputs by the
providing governments or their citizens, cause shifts in international trade
flows, and adversely affect comparative national economic advantages. For
these reasons, it is rarely discussed in regard to national innovation policies,
although analyses sometimes focus on the misappropriation of domestic
government-funded research by foreign firms or governments, legitimately or
through espionage.148
7. General Considerations
Direct and other subsidies to R&D may be a “useful substitute for stringent
property rights designed to enhance R&D incentives and to reduce the extent
of spillovers,” even if the need for a close relationship between upstream
research and downstream development limits the value of such subsidies and
suggests their use principally in areas where they will result in substantial
positive spillovers.149 The fact that such subsidies can substitute for intellectual
property rights also suggests that intellectual property rights are a form of ex
post innovation subsidy (i.e., a government grant of wealth in the form of
exclusive property rights)150 conditioned on achieving certain innovation
outputs. The promise of the conditional subsidy generates ex ante incentives
for such innovation. Granting a property rights subsidy to intermediate
innovation outputs (patentable inventions rather than commercial products)
may direct ex ante private investment toward more basic research by avoiding
concerns about keeping research secret while internally recycling it to pursue
further innovation.151 For present purposes, however, I have placed intellectual
property rights in the market regulation category, as I believe they are better
classified as a form of market intervention (through grants of exclusivity) and
because of the importance of their relationship to market competition
regulation after the grant of exclusive rights (subject to doctrines within
147 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 63, at 133 (distinguishing foreign aid “pull programs,” for which the
public pays only if successful products are developed, from “push programs” that fund research).
148 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 355. See generally Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-294, §101, 110 Stat. 3488, 3488–89 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831, 1832 (2006))
(addressing trade secrets).
149 Janusz A. Ordover, Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting Industrial and
Intellectual Property, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 503, 509 (1984).
150 See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Authors’ Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for Redistributing
Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 235–36 (2003).
151 See Frischmann, supra note 14, at 379 (noting returns to investment through licensing and the ability
to draft patent claims to cover readily identified spillovers).
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intellectual property law⎯such as preemption, misuse, and exhaustion⎯and
outside such law—such as antitrust, price, product or process, consumerprotection, and other regulatory laws).
The choices that government can make among the various kinds of
subsidies should depend on the degree to which the innovation outputs can be
reliably predicted; the commercial nature of the research; and the comparative
effectiveness of government administrators and firm actors in making
predictions, directing the R&D, and generating innovation outputs.152 As
noted, targeted R&D tax subsidies (and the ex ante incentives they generate)
are useful principally for profit-making ventures, and they will leave control of
innovation development to such firms, which is debatably better than having
the government direct which innovations to target.153 But such simple insights
do not get us very far because other forms of subsidies are available that could
potentially induce more effective and efficient R&D and innovation
development in the private sector. Such alternative subsidies include funds
provided to universities and nonprofit research centers, or development
through subsidizing private foundations. There simply are too many potentially
effective alternative subsidy mechanisms to choose from.154 Further, as noted
above, the preference for private control of development may not be
adequately justified, in general or relative to particular government
bureaucracies or public–private partnerships that exist or could be
developed.155 The comparative R&D effectiveness of the relevant actors is
unlikely to be known without detailed institutional analyses or experiments. In
short, far too little is known to intelligently make very important decisions with
far too much money.

152 See id. at 352–53; Henrik Vejen Kristensen et al., Adopting Eco-Innovation in Danish Polymer
Industry Working with Nanotechnology: Drivers, Barriers and Future Strategies, 6 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. &
BUS. 416, 416, 433 (2009); see also Frischmann, supra note 14, at 392 (discussing choices depending on
“subtle differences in the manner in which they target innovation market failures, rely on information
processing, and have dynamic effects on incentives and other institutions”).
153 See Frischmann, supra note 14, at 352–53.
154 See, e.g., id. at 392–95 (comparing easier cases at the ends of the public–private-goods innovation
spectrum for applied research with the greater complexity in between, and noting the increased difficulty of
analyzing issues for more basic research).
155 See Tomain, supra note 53, at 404–16 (discussing the five Belfer principles—clearly defined mission,
visionary and technically excellent leadership, entrepreneurial and competitive culture, structure and
management system balancing independence and accountability, and stable and predictable funding⎯and two
additional principles⎯“sell discipline,” or a focus on marketability, and planning and evaluation⎯and
encouraging adoption of government energy-innovation agencies applying these principles); Radka, supra note
101.
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As has long been recognized, moreover, subsidies may distort research and
other markets and over-reward innovation efforts.156 For example, direct
subsidies may be provided to university professors who fail to produce quality
research. Comparison to the developing understanding of intellectual property
rights is helpful here. The creation of such rights to better assure the
appropriability of R&D investments—or to avoid the loss of positive
externalities by inducing disclosures rather than reliance on secrecy157—may
result in raised prices, potentially wasteful duplication of research to obtain the
property right, and the potential for excessive and strategically exploited
market power.158 This is true even if decentralized, competitive research and
attendant waste from duplication of efforts arguably performs better at
technological development than centralized, controlled research that avoids
such duplication.159 Direct R&D subsidies do not eliminate the potential for
wasteful duplication of research efforts. But they also do not typically
contribute to such duplication, absent intentional decisions to provide
redundancy of research efforts to maximize the likelihood of achieving success
from different research paths, or⎯as discussed infra in Part II.B⎯to avoid
reliance on single sources of R&D expertise.160
Unlike intellectual property grants, direct, prize, administrative, and foreign
aid subsidies typically do not come with any necessary relationship to market
regulation. However, such subsidies sometimes may be coupled with tax,
production, or consumption subsidies, or with guaranteed procurements that
156 See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, Solar Firm Aided by U.S. Shuts Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2011, at B1;
Hans Biebl, Energy Subsidies, Market Distortion, and a Free Market Alternative, MICH. J. L. REFORM ONLINE
(Oct.
25,
2012),
http://www.mjlr.org/2012/10/energy-subsidies-market-distortion-and-a-free-marketalternative/.
157 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 372 n.91; Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 107–08 (discussing patent and trade-secrecy
tradeoffs in regard to “self-disclosing” and “non-self-disclosing” inventions).
158 See Ordover, supra note 149, at 507; cf. MACHLUP, supra note 23, at 7 (discussing simultaneous
invention and noting the lack of social utility to the duplicative inventive outputs, characterizing the services of
duplicative inventors as “free goods”).
159 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 372–73 (noting that duplication may be wasteful only for
applied research having known, narrow applications); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 842–43 (1990) (discussing Edmund W. Kitch, The
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977), providing reasons why competition
may be more successful, and tracing historical examples); cf. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of
Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 442–44 (2004) (discussing innovation races and rent dissipation by three
mechanisms⎯accelerated research expenditures, duplicative efforts, and reduced time for commercialization
under monopoly conditions⎯under which competition is channeled to earlier placement of innovation in the
public domain to maximize social welfare).
160 See infra notes 173–93 and accompanying text.
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can dramatically alter market dynamics.161 Conversely, intellectual property
rights may be granted through auctions rather than through temporal races,
which can reduce the implicit subsidies and wealth transfers that the exclusive
rights supply. Depending on the auction’s contract-like conditions, such grants
can reduce the deadweight losses of patent races, monopoly pricing, and
failures to develop or license within the prospect and market.162 Arguably,
direct and prize subsidies already are or could be awarded through auctions of
various types, which would reduce the social costs of awarding them. For
example, applications for direct subsidies are already assessed to determine
which grantee is most likely to generate the desired innovation outcomes,
thereby providing bidding competition based on perceived competence rather
than the amount of the subsidy to be awarded.163 Both direct subsidies and
prizes could be awarded to competitors that offer to achieve the desired
innovation output for the lowest reward, with the distinction being whether the
amount is actually conditioned on achieving success. What should be obvious
from this discussion is that choosing the right actor to direct money (or other
embellishments) and the right amount of the subsidy to achieve any particular
innovation output in the most efficient way may require both information that
is not currently available and institutional competencies that do not currently
exist. In many cases the innovation output desired is itself uncertain.
Subsidies provide financing and various other embellishments that can
reduce political, currency, regulatory, execution, technology, and unfamiliarity
risks that exist regarding technology dissemination efforts, and thereby induce
161 Cf. Brennan et al., supra note 75, at 6–18 (comparing prizes, patents, contracts, grants, and standard
procurement; noting similar problems of analysis and distributional effects regarding tax policy choices; and
describing idiosyncratic benefits of relying on prizes).
162 See, e.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT
OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969); Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races over Auctions,
60 STAN. L. REV. 803, 804–25 (2007) (citing, inter alia, Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’
Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and NonInjunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999)); Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 348 (1968); R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959);
Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55, 63 (1968); see also Michael Abramowicz, The
Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065 (2007) (suggesting a system of
patent-extension auctions under which a patentee would be allowed to request such an auction, but could only
win it by substantially outbidding third parties); cf. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement
Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1593–98 (2011) (noting that a standard where the patent will
not issue if the invention would have been created anyway avoids deadweight losses, but arguing for a more
limited inducement standard based on delayed deadweight losses).
163 See, e.g., Peer Review Process, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer_review_
process.htm#scoring (last updated Mar. 4, 2013) (discussing review criteria for grants and cooperative
agreements, which include scientific merit, significance, and investigator suitability).

SARNOFF GALLEYSPROOFS1

2013]

GOVERNMENT CHOICES IN INNOVATION FUNDING

6/11/2013 9:03 AM

1127

investment in R&D, innovation, and technology development.164 Further, when
subsidies are specifically tied to developing particular technologies or fields,165
they may raise substantial trade concerns over market distortion, preferential
treatment, and national efforts to promote comparative advantage.166 As
discussed infra in Part II.E,167 however, R&D markets and subsidies are
thought to be different from production markets and subsidies. R&D
innovation subsidies—whether direct, prize based, or tax based—have been
treated differently from production and consumption subsidies in light of the
broad recognition of their public-goods character. For example, R&D subsidies
(structured in a particular manner) were for a time considered nonactionable
under the WTO’s subsidies and countervailing duties code.168 Whether and
when such differential treatment is justified or tolerated may ultimately be a
political question regarding how much R&D to promote. But the issue will
likely remain controversial, and trade concerns will likely create pressures to
direct the choices of innovation funds away from production and consumption
subsidies or from R&D subsidies for particular technologies or fields.

164

See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE WORKING GRP. III, METHODOLOGICAL
TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 5–6 (2000), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
special-reports/spm/srtt-en.pdf; SUNIL MANI, GOVERNMENT, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 29–35 (2002) (explaining the relationship between financial
measures such as tax incentives and venture capital with the promotion of innovation in developed countries,
finding that tax incentives are “the most important and widely used instrument” of fiscal incentives for
promoting innovation and R&D); WORLD BANK, supra note 4, at 292–94, 303, 311; see also Frischmann,
supra note 14, at 363 (discussing production and appropriation risks).
165 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, §§ 1101, 1141, 123 Stat.
115, 319, 326–28 (extending tax credits for renewable energy production, furnishing substantial public funds
for transportation and energy infrastructure, and providing a range of direct and production and consumption
subsidies for various energy-efficiency and renewable-energy technologies); cf. American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 111–16, 123–25, 171, 724, 782 (2009). This proposal was
known as the Waxman–Markey bill, and would have established an emissions trading scheme and provided
substantial subsidies for clean energy technologies, carbon capture and sequestration, electric and other
advanced technology vehicles, and basic R&D.
166 See, e.g., INT’L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FACT SHEET: COMMERCE PRELIMINARILY
FINDS DUMPING OF CRYSTALLINE SILICON PHOTOVOLTAIC CELLS, WHETHER OR NOT ASSEMBLED INTO
MODULES FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2012), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/
factsheets/factsheet-prc-solar-cells-adcvd-prelim-20120320.pdf (noting preliminary determination of dumping
of various Chinese solar cells); Matthew Dalton & Jan Hromadko, EU to Investigate Chinese Solar-Panel
Makers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2012, at B3 (noting investigations in the European Union on Chinese solar
panels based on allegations of illegal subsidies from below-market export pricing, which was financed by
state-owned, bank-provided low-cost loans, and discussing China’s efforts to promote its solar photovoltaic
sector).
167 See infra notes 280–84 and accompanying text.
168 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement].

AND

SARNOFF GALLEYSPROOFS1

1128

6/11/2013 9:03 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1087

Finally, returning to comparative innovation-inducing effectiveness, direct
subsidies for particular innovation outputs will likely be more effective than
indirect ones (such as generalized R&D tax subsidies) where there are market
failures or other externalities that make commercialization of a technology
unlikely.169 Examples that illustrate this include the development of new
medicines to address neglected diseases for which expected returns are
insufficient to fund clinical trials or pollution controls when the health and
environmental harms can continue to be externalized.170 Recent studies suggest
that subsidies may be less effective than market regulation (particularly
regarding the internalization of externalities) in promoting innovation, that
both combined are more effective than either separately, and that subsidies
may, in some circumstances, be more effective and efficient in inducing
innovation than taxing externalities.171
Again, this does not get us very far. Having canvassed subsidies relatively
thoroughly, I address below the other forms of innovation funding choice
(except market regulation) somewhat more cursorily, referring back to
considerations that have now been elaborated.
B. Procurement
As noted above, procurement resembles R&D and innovation subsidies, but
it typically provides incentives by conditioning funding on achieving
innovation outputs that are commercial or noncommercial products.172
Through 1993 in the United States, R&D procurement contracts composed the
largest amount of federal public-sector support for R&D, followed by
subsidies, which took the form of tax incentives more than direct grants.173
This may seem surprising but is partially explained by the dramatic growth of
military expenditures as a proportion of the overall budget and by the general
decline of R&D expenditures since its peak during the Cold War space race in
169

See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 382–83, 394–98.
See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach
for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1053 (2005); Popp et al., supra note 37, at 2–3, 48–
49; cf. Sean Flynn et al., An Economic Justification for Open Access to Essential Medicine Patents in
Developing Countries, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 184, 188–92 (2009) (discussing failures to price discriminate in
providing medicines to countries with highly stratified incomes).
171 See, e.g., Popp et al., supra note 37, at 4–5; see also id. at 5 (citing Rob Hart, The Timing of Taxes on
CO2 Emissions when Technological Change Is Endogenous, 55 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 194 (2008)) (noting
that targeted R&D subsidies may induce more rapid technological development at lower costs than increased
early taxation above externality-internalizing levels).
172 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
173 See MANI, supra note 164, at 10, 31 fig.1.11, 32 tbl.1.8.
170
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the 1960s.174 A significant portion of current defense R&D costs can be
attributed to the development and procurement of very high-technology
weapons systems,175 although other governmental expenditures (within and
outside the defense sector) of purchased outputs also may have led to induced
R&D and innovation.
There are many possible forms of procurement that allocate risk differently
between the parties to the procurement contract. These include fixed price with
sealed bidding or negotiated prices, with the producer bearing most of the cost
and profit risks; negotiated cost reimbursement, with the government bearing
most of the risks; and all sorts of intermediate types.176 Of course, the
government bears the risk that the contractor will not produce as desired, and
the contractor bears the risk that the government will not appropriate sufficient
funds to fulfill the contract—which is subject to the Anti-Deficiency Act.177
Similarly, procurement of innovation can be distinguished among the
following: direct procurement for the government as the only consumer of
goods and services (e.g., bomber aircraft) or as a catalyst for the market (e.g.,
software); procurement at commercial or precommercial stages; general
procurement of innovation outputs; strategic procurement of outputs intended
to stimulate the market; cooperative procurement with both public and private
sectors as buyers and users; or exclusively catalytic procurement where private
entities ultimately are the sole exclusive users of the innovative outputs.178
174

See, e.g., Robert Pollin & Heidi Garrett-Peltier, Benefits of a Slimmer Pentagon, NATION, May 28,
2012, at 15 (describing how military spending in 2011 reflected 4.7% of gross domestic product, while in 2000
it reflected 3%); Policy Basics: Where Do Our Federal Tax Dollars Go?, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1258 (last updated Aug. 13, 2012) (discussing
the 2011 budget, which allocated 20% to defense and international security, 3% to transportation and
infrastructure, 2% to education, and 2% to science and medical research); R&D Spending by the Federal
Government, DEPARTMENT NUMBERS (Jan. 2, 2012), http://www.deptofnumbers.com/blog/2012/01/rdspending-by-federal-gov. See generally ELISA EISEMAN ET AL., RAND SCI. & TECH. POLICY INST., FEDERAL
INVESTMENT IN R&D (2002), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1639.0.pdf
(reviewing the federal government’s R&D portfolio and recommending areas where programs should be
expanded, curtailed, or maintained); Mark Boroush et al., Research and Development: National Trends and
International Comparisons, in SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2012, at 4-1 (2012), available at
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind12/pdf/seind12.pdf (focusing on R&D and presenting data on public and
private performance in the United States, as well as examining related international investments or transactions
involving R&D financing or performance).
175 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. (COMPTROLLER)/CFO, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FISCAL
YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST: PROGRAM ACQUISITION COSTS BY WEAPON SYSTEM, at table of contents
(2011), available at http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2012/FY2012_Weapons.pdf.
176 See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. pt. 16 (2012).
177 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
178 See, e.g., Jakob Edler & Luke Georghiou, Public Procurement and Innovation—Resurrecting the
Demand Side, 36 RES. POL’Y 949, 953–54 (2007).
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Although there is no theoretically necessary relationship between
government procurement and the creation of intellectual property rights, the
Bayh–Dole Act applies to government procurement contracts “for the
performance of experimental, developmental, or research work funded in
whole or in part by the Federal Government.”179 Additionally, a complex set of
federal agency regulations and policies exists regarding the creation,
ownership, or use of intellectual property rights or rights in data developed
through a broader range of government contracts, including those not primarily
intended to promote R&D or innovation.180 However, contractors working “by
or for” the government are free to “use or manufacture” the patents or
copyrights of third parties without a license if they are within the scope of the
procurement contract, and the government is subject to liability to the rights
holder for “reasonable and entire compensation” through a statutory takings
claim.181
The effects of procurement on innovation depend partly on whether the
contracts take the form of “push” or “pull” mechanisms with regard to existing
or future markets. Push mechanisms (ex ante market procurement) provide a
demonstration of technology and a stimulus to market development so that
industry may subsequently be more willing to risk market entry.182 Push
mechanisms also raise questions as to the size of the government sector and its
adequacy to demonstrate commercial viability in a broader market without
government subsidies to production or consumption. Regulation of market
prices for innovation outputs (or rate-based returns to regulated industries, as
in the electric utility sector) further complicates the evaluation of the
inducement effectiveness and adequacy of innovation returns to procurement
funding.183
Pull mechanisms (ex post market procurement) provide ex ante innovation
incentives based on ex post assurances (to innovation creation) of the adequacy
179

35 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).
See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. pts. 27, 227 (2012).
181 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006); see also Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1326–27
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that government liability under § 1498 is not limited to patent infringement liability
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), but that it also applies to § 271(g)).
182 See, e.g., RUTTAN, supra note 26, at 108–09 (discussing government procurement of software).
183 See, e.g., Joskow & Rose, supra note 105, at 1464–77 (discussing studies of the effects on prices in
various regulated and deregulated industries); C. O. Ruggles, Problems of Public-Utility Rate Regulation and
Fair Return, 32 J. POL. ECON. 543, 543–58 (1924) (discussing lack of clear definitions, changes in conditions,
duplication concerns, character of service, and efficiency of management); cf. Duffy, supra note 159, at 444–
45 (citing Demsetz, supra note 162) (comparing patent-prospect management and auction pricing to that of
natural monopolies).
180
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of scale for commercialization, which again reduces market entry risks. These
ex post assurances of procurement (advanced purchase commitment contracts)
are, effectively, ex post consumption subsidies where the government acts as a
consumer on behalf of the public. However, the price terms of these ex post
innovation contracts may be highly uncertain and subject to statutory and
“march-in” rights regarding patented innovation outputs and other
contractually retained rights. Often, as with public–private partnerships, the
scope of the market purchase guarantees, conditions on market behavior and
pricing terms, and treatment of developed intellectual property and retained
ownership rights are negotiated in advance.184
Bidding also affects the amount of funding that is directed at innovation
through procurement mechanisms. Bidding for procurement thus resembles
auctioning for prizes, with the potential awardees competing ex ante to lower
the funding levels they hope to obtain and for which they are willing to work
for a defined innovation output. However, the ex ante contract award
(particularly with progress payments) is perhaps less conditioned on achieving
the output than an ex post prize award.185 This brings to mind the old adage,
“you get what you pay for.” In contrast, bidding competition regarding nonprice terms resembles direct subsidy grant review, where the amount of
funding is fixed but the choice of “contractor” best situated to achieve the
predetermined innovation outputs are determined based on other factors.186
As with subsidies,187 government procurement of R&D or innovation may
sometimes crowd out private R&D funding. Procurement thus may be
particularly appropriate for costly private good production where there is no
market or where the recovery of costs is uncertain, and where firms will not
otherwise expend funds on R&D or innovation.188 Accordingly, procurement
drives much military R&D and also some medical R&D through guaranteed
purchase contracts for medicines for developing-country markets.189

184 See, e.g., Ron A. Bouchard, Qualifying Intellectual Property II: A New Innovation Index for
Pharmaceutical Patents & Products, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 287, 382 (2011–2012).
185 See supra notes 133–37 and accompanying text.
186 See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text. Further, the outputs of bidding may often be much
less specific than in contracting.
187 See, e.g., Scott J. Wallsten, The Effects of Government-Industry R&D Programs on Private R&D: The
Case of the Small Business Innovation Research Program, 31 RAND J. ECON. 82, 82–83 (2000).
188 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 14, at 373–74 & n.100, 390, 391 n.192.
189 See, e.g., supra note 26; see also U.S. PRESIDENT’S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF, USING
SCIENCE TO SAVE LIVES: LATEST PEPFAR FUNDING (2012), available at http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/
organization/189671.pdf (documenting funding since 2004).
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Procurement also may be duplicative and thus potentially wasteful of R&D
funding inputs. Multiple sourcing of procured technology, however, can lead to
broader and quicker diffusion of knowledge and to an increased pace of
innovation.190 Sole sourcing, moreover, is discouraged by the FAR to avoid
concerns about monopoly pricing.191
Finally, procurement may raise serious trade concerns, particularly if
procurement favors domestic industries and thereby imposes non-neutral
innovation risk reductions. For example, China has recently engaged in
substantial domestic procurement preferences and administrative subsidies to
promote “national champion” industries that can develop export markets,
which force creation of joint ventures that transfer innovative technologies “in
exchange for being granted the ability to invest in China.”192 Given that R&D
subsidies may be treated differently,193 the trade concerns may be more or less
severe when the procurement is directed at particular R&D outputs or at
general market activities that require R&D inputs.
C. Direct Development
The government engages in all sorts of R&D and innovation funded
through general or specific taxes and other sources of government revenue.
This reflects that government employees are user-innovators,194 that
government agencies engage in R&D to generate different kinds of innovation
outputs in the course of conducting their statutory mandates, and that

190 See, e.g., RUTTAN, supra note 26, at 101 (discussing the military procurement policy of “second
sourcing” to avoid dependence on single suppliers and its effects on diffusion of knowledge and entry of new
firms).
191 See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. §§ 6.300–.305 (2012) (establishing requirements for when contracting can occur
other than through full and open competition).
192 ROBERT D. ATKINSON, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., ENOUGH IS ENOUGH: CONFRONTING
CHINESE INNOVATION MERCANTILISM 33 (2012), available at http://www.itif.org/publications/enough-enoughconfronting-chinese-innovation-mercantilism; see, e.g., Siyuan An & Brian Peck, China’s Indigenous
Innovation Policy in the Context of Its WTO Obligations and Commitments, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 375, 417–23,
434–42 (2011) (discussing whether, if the purchasing by Chinese government agencies requires import
substitution for accredited indigenous innovation products, it qualifies as a subsidy under Article 1 and is
prohibited by Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, on a de jure—mandated—or de facto—in practice—basis; also
analyzing potential claims for lack of national treatment regarding maintenance and use rights of intellectual
property and discrimination against patents by field of technology under Articles 3 and 27.1 of the TRIPS
agreement); Boumil, supra note 81, at 775–77 (discussing exceptions in annexes to the GPA and to the
national treatment in procurement obligation of Art. III—including for R&D activities—and noting potential
violations if China were to accede to the GPA).
193 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
194 See supra notes 39, 40 and accompanying text.
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government sometimes creates specialized bureaucracies to perform R&D and
generate innovation in particular sectors. The most well-known of these
specialized R&D bureaucracies are the national laboratories (including
weapons laboratories) operated by various government departments, but there
are other government institutions primarily focused on R&D, such as the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).195 Some national
laboratories receive large amounts of funding for their particular fields, which
may be greater or less than corresponding subsidies or procurement funds
directed to private entities in those fields. For one example, the National
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) of the Department of Energy—
originally, the Solar Energy Research Institute—received $110 million in
innovation research funding under the 2009 American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act.196
As noted earlier, government policy permits cooperative R&D agreements
(CRADAs) with private entities.197 This permits greater leveraging of federal
funding for particular forms of innovation conducted within the government.
Further, private entities may manage government research bureaucracies, such
as the NREL, blurring the line between the public and private sectors.198
Additionally, government can collaborate among its own agencies,199 with
subsidiary or foreign governments, or with intergovernmental organizations
through interpersonnel agreements (IPA)200 and other collaborative efforts and

195 Cf. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, § 12(d)(2), 100 Stat. 1785, 1787
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3710a (2006)) (“[T]he term ‘laboratory’ means a facility or group of
facilities owned, leased, or otherwise used by a Federal agency, a substantial purpose of which is the
performance of research, development, or engineering by employees of the Federal Government.”).
196 See RIMMER, supra note 97, at 287.
197 See Federal Technology Transfer Act § 12(d)(1) (“[T]he term ‘cooperative research and development
agreement’ means any agreement between one or more Federal laboratories and one or more non-Federal
parties under which the Government, through its laboratories, provides personnel, services, facilities,
equipment, or other resources with or without reimbursement (but not funds to non-Federal parties) and the
non-Federal parties provide funds, personnel, services, facilities, equipment, or other resources toward the
conduct of specified research or development efforts which are consistent with the missions of the laboratory;
except that such term does not include a procurement contract or cooperative agreement . . . .”); supra note 133
and accompanying text (discussing CRADAs); see also RIMMER, supra note 97, at 276–77 (noting government
institutional development alone or in joint partnerships with the private sector).
198 See, e.g., National Renewable Energy Laboratory, BATTELLE, http://www.battelle.org/ourwork/laboratory-management/national-renewable-energy-laboratory (last visited May 12, 2013). NREL is
managed by the Alliance for Sustainable Energy, LLC.
199 See, e.g., OMB 2013 BUDGET REPORT, supra note 56, at 369.
200 See, e.g., Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-648, 84 Stat. 1909 (1971) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4701 et seq. (2006)).
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personnel exchanges.201 Government also can engage in collaborative R&D,
thereby pooling funds, technology, and other resources like in jointventuring.202
Government direct development thus may lead to the generation of
government-owned intellectual property rights. For example, NREL possesses
a significant portfolio of patents on wind turbines, generators, power systems,
cooling towers, biofuels, and geothermal technologies and building
construction. NREL has also developed an online database—the Energy
Efficiency and Renewable Energy Technology Portal—to license its rights.203
Depending on how they are exercised, these government-owned intellectual
property rights may have further effects on domestic and foreign markets and
trade flows.204 Whether and how the government chooses to license its
intellectual property rights for further R&D or innovation then becomes an
important issue, as the government may choose to compete with the private
sector in the market (although it rarely does). Even if the government does not
directly compete with the private sector and supplies only to the government
sector, government development and supply can lead to price reductions in the
commercial market through competitive development, as well as to private
market shares that would be smaller than if the government sector were
included and in which private entities could better recoup their innovation
investments.
International collaborations similarly raise questions about the joint
management of intellectual property that may be required or developed. For
example, in regard to collaborations to develop technology and intellectual
property through shared investment in research, former Secretary of Energy
Steven Chu noted:
201

See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation
on Climate Change, Energy and Environment Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the People’s Republic of China (July 28, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2009/july/126592.htm; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Memorandum of Understanding Signed Between
the Government of India and the Government of the United States (Nov. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/press/2009/132776.htm (dealing with enhanced cooperation regarding energy
security, energy efficiency, clean energy, and climate change). See generally BUSH, supra note 16, at 107–08
(discussing scientific congresses, international fellowships, and scientific attachés).
202 See, e.g., supra notes 133, 201 and accompanying text.
203 RIMMER, supra note 97, at 290–91 (noting NREL patent portfolios in other technology areas).
204 Id. at 266 (noting comments regarding the joint ownership of intellectual property emerging from the
US–China Clean Energy Center that “‘the plan is for the two governments to get royalty-free access to the
intellectual property that comes out of the center; private companies could buy in at low rates’” (quoting
Daniel Roth, The Radical Pragmatist, WIRED, May 2010, at 104, 108) (citation omitted)).
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These joint efforts will allow several nations to share the costs and
benefits of intellectual property they jointly fund, helping avoid
disputes over intellectual property rights and speeding the world’s
transition to a clean energy economy.
. . . Sharing of IPR . . . should be done where the sharing is
mutually beneficial . . . . for example . . . by an exchange of nonproprietary information, royalty free or royalty bearing cross
licensing, a patent pool . . . open source software distribution . . . .
[and] may very well inure to the commercial benefit of the supplying
205
entity by opening new markets.

Like its contractors in procurement, the government cannot be enjoined from
using intellectual property that it needs because it has waived sovereign
immunity only for suits for reasonable compensation.206 Given their inherent
powers, government agencies may be more able than private entities to seek to
compel transfers of know-how to support their R&D and innovation-producing
activities.207
Finally, depending on their internal cultures and public mores, government
agencies may be more or less able to attract needed R&D and innovationproducing expertise.208 Government employment may currently be viewed as
less attractive than jobs in the private commercial and nonprofit sectors, and
government employees may currently be subject to greater public

205 Id. at 264–65 (quoting Letter from Steven Chu, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, to F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr., Ranking Republican Member, U.S. House of Representatives Select Comm. on Energy
Independence & Global Warming (May 5, 2009)).
206 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006); Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331,
341–44 (1928); supra note 181 and accompanying text.
207 See, e.g., FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER NO.
12, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS OF BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN LIGHT OF
U.S. FEDERAL LAW 11–12 (2006), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteipc20064_en.pdf (discussing the
inherent power of the government to compel such action by law and the U.S. Government’s implied threat to
compel production of ciprofloxacin in response to an anthrax scare). See generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, Striking
a Balance: When Should Trade-Secret Law Shield Disclosures to the Government?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 791
(2011) (discussing how courts should approach “refusal-to-submit” cases, where companies refuse to submit
information requested by the government).
208 See BUSH, supra note 16, at 95–98 (discussing criteria for selecting civil servants to promote R&D and
recommending various forms of R&D cooperation across government agencies); U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD.,
ATTRACTING THE NEXT GENERATION: A LOOK AT FEDERAL ENTRY-LEVEL NEW HIRES (2008), available at
http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=314895&version=315306&application=
ACROBAT (exploring how the federal government attracts and hires new employees, especially in regard to
R&D).
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opprobrium,209 but this is not a necessary state of affairs. Direct development
by the government should not be routinely dismissed as an innovation funding
choice, although creating new bureaucracies may be politically difficult in the
current climate. As noted by then-Secretary of Energy Chu, “I took the
challenge of being Secretary of Energy in part for the chance to ensure that the
[DOE] Laboratories and our country’s universities will generate ideas that will
help us address our energy challenges. . . . DOE must strive to be the modern
version of the old Bell Labs in energy research.”210
This merely reinforces the need for additional study of the relative
efficiency and effectiveness of direct development compared to private-sector
funding options regarding the creation of large- or small-scale innovation
outputs. In addition to the factors noted above, more specific analysis is needed
in regard to the comparative expertise in identifying and directing development
of scientific and technological research, and the comparative ability to develop,
commercialize, market, and license the various kinds of innovation outputs.211
D. Constructed Commons
Yet another form of government innovation funding relates to the creation
of various kinds of commons for managing physical or information resources
to induce innovation.212 The most obvious form of commons is government-

209 See, e.g., U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., supra note 208, at 31 (“[C]ollege graduates and public policy
graduate students tend to view entry-level Government jobs as less challenging, rewarding and professionally
beneficial than private and nonprofit sector jobs. They tend to believe that the private sector offers better
compensation, more challenging work and better developmental opportunities, while the nonprofit sector
offers more rewarding work.”); Charles Babington, Mitt Romney’s Public, Private Jobs Claims Contradict,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 14, 2012, 2:39 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/14/mitt-romney-jobspublic-private_n_1596034.html (quoting former presidential candidate Mitt Romney as saying, “[w]e have
145,000 more government workers under this president. Let’s send them home and put you back to work”).
210 RIMMER, supra note 97, at 261 (alteration in original) (quoting New Directions for Energy Research
and Development at the U.S. Department of Energy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 111th
Cong. 17 (2009) (statement of Steven Chu, Secretary of Energy)).
211 To some extent, these considerations recapitulate the Bayh–Dole Act discussion above. See supra
notes 64–76 and accompanying text.
212 See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Copyright, Fair Use, and Creative Commons Licenses, in RISK AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN LIBRARIES: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE 18 (Pamela Bluh & Cindy Hepfer
eds., 2009); Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 82, at 681–82; see also Terry L. Anderson &
Gary D. Libecap, Forging a New Environmental and Resource Economics Paradigm: The Contractual Bases
for Exchange, in PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION 117, 117–28 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A.
Paredes eds., 2012) (discussing the evolutionary nature of property rights and their creation by government,
which facilitates bargaining regarding relevant resources). See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy
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created or government-subsidized physical infrastructure, such as the highway
system or the Internet.213 But commons in information also may be
constructed, subsidized, or regulated by government. For example, the World
Meteorological Organization—a United Nations specialized agency—and
others sponsor and make available data on polar climate conditions that are
generated and submitted by governments and private sector scientists.214
Another example, the Conservation Commons, is a cooperative effort of
intergovernmental
organizations,
nongovernmental
organizations,
governments, academic institutions, and entities from the private sector; the
Conservation Commons supports open access to data and sharing (with
attribution) of information and knowledge for mutual benefit regarding
biodiversity.215 The U.S. government’s Global Positioning Satellite (GPS)
signals are freely available from the military and NASA, following an
international incident after which NASA concluded that the public benefits of
new, nonmilitary and nonaviation uses of the data justified continuing to
provide it free of cost.216 Government also may manage commons that are
created with private data, such as the U.S. National Library of Medicine’s
PubMed Central, and submission to such a commons may either be encouraged
or required by government agency policies.217

of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce,
and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
213 See, e.g., FRISCHMANN, supra note 23, at 5–6 (discussing various features that help to define
infrastructure); Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89
MINN. L. REV. 917, 923–24, 956 (2005) (noting “traditional” infrastructure of transportation, communication,
and governance systems, as well as basic public services and facilities like schools and sewers; defining
infrastructure from the demand-side by reference to non-rivalrous inputs for which social demand is driven by
their use as inputs to downstream productive activity and that are used to produce widespread outputs);
Mandel, When to Open Infrastructure, supra note 136, at 208–10 (discussing three stages of infrastructure for
which open access may differentially reduce ex ante innovation incentives: (1) not yet conceived; (2)
conceived but not yet developed; and (3) developed and need to be managed); Konstantinos K. Stylianou, An
Innovation-Centric Approach of Telecommunications Infrastructure Regulation, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 221,
231–40 (2011) (discussing interactions of innovation, market forces, and regulation in telecommunications).
214 See, e.g., Welcome to the Polar Information Commons (PIC), POLAR INFO. COMMONS,
http://www.polarcommons.org/ (last visited May 12, 2013).
215 See, e.g., Conservation Commons, CONSERVEONLINE, http://conserveonline.org/workspaces/commons/
(last visited May 12, 2013).
216 See, e.g., James Love & Tim Hubbard, Paying for Public Goods, in CODE: COLLABORATIVE
OWNERSHIP AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 207, 208–09 (Rishab Aiyer Ghosh ed., 2005).
217 See, e.g., Revised Policy on Enhancing Public Access to Archived Publications Resulting from NIHFunded Research, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/not-od-08-033.html
(last visited May 12, 2013); see also Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–8, § 217, 123 Stat.
524, 782 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 282c (2006)).
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In addition to formal commons, informal commons of governmentsponsored information and other outputs also exist. For example, many forms
of government records qualify as public-sector information that may be made
available for free or at noncommercial prices for further private, commercial
and nonprofit use.218
Government may subsidize and regulate private-sector-commons
institutions regarding prices of inputs and outputs, access, and other terms of
interaction, without limiting the application of competition law and policy.219
Similar to government direct development, government-commons approaches
may supplement or compete with the private sector in regard to innovation
promotion. For example, governments may affect commons-based activities by
requiring or encouraging the pooling of technology or intellectual property
rights;220 providing or supporting free or low-cost access to information
outputs that are R&D or innovation inputs;221 and engaging in or encouraging
interpersonnel exchanges.222 If technology- or patent-pooling occurs,
significant competition regulation issues will arise. For example, in the area of
patent-pools, questions arise regarding whether patents in the pool are essential
or nonessential, and concerns are raised over the preclusion of alternative
technologies, which concerns supplement more routine competition concerns

218 See, e.g., Council Directive 2003/98, On the Re-Use of Public Sector Information, 2003 O.J. (L 345)
90 (EC).
219 See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation, 25
YALE J. ON REG. 135, 164–75 (2008) (discussing private pricing and access contractual options and private
subsidies that others seek to establish through government-mandated, zero-price approaches); Michael J.
Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, The University as Constructed Cultural Commons,
30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 365, 375–76 (2009) (noting, inter alia, subsidies, safe harbors, privileges, or
exemptions from antitrust liability used to facilitate or create commons). See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG,
CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006) (discussing how hardware and software as well as law regulates the Internet
commons).
220 For a good discussion of the classic example of the government’s threat to nationalize production in
the aircraft sector, which led to creation of a privately managed patent pool—the Manufactured Aircraft
Association—and subsequent commons-based developments, see Dustin R. Szakalski, Progress in the Aircraft
Industry and the Role of Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing Agreements, 15 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2011);
Harry T. Dykman, Patent Licensing Within the Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association (MAA), 46 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 646 (1964); and Merges & Nelson, supra note 159, at 888–90.
221 See, e.g., Human Genome Project Information, U.S. DEPARTMENT ENERGY OFF. SCI.,
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/home.shtml (last modified July 31, 2012); INT’L
HAPMAP PROJECT, http://hapmap.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ (last visited May 12, 2013); Technology Mechanism,
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/ttclear/jsp/
TechnologyMechanism.jsp (last visited May 12, 2013).
222 See, e.g., Establishing Linkages with American Institutions, BRIT. COUNCIL, http://www.britishcouncil.
org/br/usa-education-marketing-guide-establishing-linkages (last visited May 12, 2013).
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regarding barriers to entry, diminishing of competition, and trying to extend
market power.223
Similarly, public-sourced or public-sponsored commons may compete with
private efforts to create commons, whether through the creation of technology
or intellectual property pools or databases, or through the encouragement of
liberal licensing policies.224 However, government-constructed and
government-managed commons do not normally or purposefully compete with
private R&D or innovation activity in research or production markets, even if
they generate information outputs that are inputs to further R&D or innovation.
Rather, such public commons typically seek to facilitate public or private R&D
and innovation by lowering investment costs in creating infrastructure or other
forms of commons resources and by pooling expertise and information that
otherwise might not as readily be compiled. Such public commons thus
typically supplement other forms of government sponsorship of public and
private R&D and innovation, rather than substitute for them.
As public recognition has grown of the development of open-source and
other commons-based collaborations for innovation (not just in the software
sector),225 more attention has been given to commons-based innovation

223 See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert, Ties That Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent Pools, 77 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1, 1–4, 11–12 (2010); see also id. at 13–15 (noting also concerns for reduced innovation incentives from
pooled rights to grantbacks of innovations—notwithstanding benefits from reduction of royalty-stacking—and
for sheltering of weak patents from challenges due to reduced incentives to litigate, while recognizing potential
benefits of reduced transaction costs for licensing complementary but not essential technologies). See
generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm
(recognizing pro-competitive benefits of intellectual property pooling arrangements and identifying prohibited
acts and concerns).
224 For some examples of various types of private physical, intellectual property, and information
commons that a government commons might supersede, see GREEN EXCHANGE, http://www.greenexchange.
com (last visited May 12, 2013) (commons real estate for eco-friendly businesses); Eco-Patent Commons,
WBCSD, http://www.wbcsd.org/work-program/capacity-building/eco-patent-commons.aspx (last visited May
12, 2013); Welcome to PLOS, PUB. LIBRARY SCI., www.plos.org (last visited May 12, 2013); and Science,
CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/science (last visited May 12, 2013). Cf. Robert M. Kunstadt
& Ilaria Maggioni, A Proposed “U.S. Public Patent Pool,” NOUVELLES, Mar. 2011, at 10, 10–13 (proposing
adoption of a mandatory opt-in “U.S. Public Patent Pool” to separate invention ownership and exploitation).
225 See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy & Leland Glenna, Private Ordering and Public Energy Innovation Policy,
36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 435–51 (2009) (recognizing the paradigm of private ordering); Charles R.
McManis, Introduction, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 3–10 (2009) (classifying symposium papers according to
four general categories: (1) business, law, and engineering perspectives; (2) open-source biotechnology; (3)
open source and proprietary software development; and (4) collaborative innovation, the economics of
innovation, and constructed commons).
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strategies.226 These analyses emphasize both the nature of the innovation
outputs of the collaborations and how the R&D, innovation efforts, outputs,
and inputs constitute the communities that produce those outputs. Constitutive
factors include, inter alia, the “rules-in-use” that determine the participation
structures (or “openness”) of the community and its conditions on access to
and uses of inputs and outputs.227 Given the multiplicity of potential rules,
structures, and conditions, numerous questions arise that are similar to those
discussed above regarding the nature of licensing behaviors or other
authorizations for uses of the innovation outputs.228 Commons can adopt very
differentiated approaches to the licensing of both inputs and outputs compared
to non-commons-based innovation efforts of firms and individuals. Further,
they can change their incentive structures over time, and various commons
rules to police input and access policies may arguably violate antitrust laws.229
One particular form of such a commons-based approach to R&D and
innovation production that is worth separately identifying is the creation of
governmental and nongovernmental standard-setting organizations.230 These
organizations can both facilitate the development of innovation outputs and
induce pooling of both inputs and outputs through cooperative licensing

226 See, e.g., Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 946–92
(arguing for conditional use by public institutions of spending and other inputs such as labor and bodily
materials to generate a distributive commons that enhances access to downstream patented technologies);
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Cultural Environmentalism and the Constructed Commons, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 25–26 (2007) (analogizing open-source software licenses to conservation easements,
which separate rights to copy from rights to exclude further copying or private rights to possess from public
rights to enjoy).
227 See, e.g., Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 82, at 695–99, 704–05 (discussing openness
and “rules-in-use”).
228 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
229 See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer, The Penguin and the Cartel: Rethinking Antitrust and Innovation Policy
for the Age of Commercial Open Source, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 269, 269–70, 296–309 (noting the increasingly
commercial nature of open-source projects and arguing that broad viral licensing—such as the GNU Public
License (GPL)—is unnecessarily restrictive and violates antitrust law).
230 See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Standard-Setting and the Failure of Price Competition, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 217, 218, 224–31 (2009) (noting benefits of standardized technology compared to competitive,
conflicting substitutes; identifying ubiquitous technological, functional, and safety-related standards; and
relating the need for and benefits of standardization to, inter alia, network effects, interoperability, and
avoidance of waste in doomed standards and obsolescent technologies); Christopher B. Hockett & Rosanna G.
Lipscomb, Best FRANDs Forever? Standard-Setting Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and the
European Union, ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 19, 19 (noting that standard-setting enhances innovation and
competition by assuring that products are compatible and interoperable); Willard K. Tom, A Field Guide to
Antitrust Issues in Standard Setting and Patent Pooling, in ANTITRUST & THE DEAL 2010, at 389, 391–92
(2010) (distinguishing standard-setting from patent pooling regarding what is addressed by the commons—
fragmentation of components and future development paths versus fragmentation of ownership).

SARNOFF GALLEYSPROOFS1

2013]

GOVERNMENT CHOICES IN INNOVATION FUNDING

6/11/2013 9:03 AM

1141

behaviors. Conversely, creation of a standard may create collusion,
competition, and market-power extension, as well as generate concerns
regarding hold up for pooled substitute and complementary technologies and
regarding lock-in effects.231 In turn, such concerns may lead to commonsbased (or government-imposed) adoption of rules to require ex ante disclosure
of patents and broad, open licensing on favorable terms, such as “reasonable
and non-discriminatory” (RAND) or “fair” RAND (FRAND) requirements.
However, such commitments may be vague, policing such rules may be
problematic, and more specific ex ante licensing negotiations between
potential users and patent holders may raise other antitrust concerns.232
As noted for direct development and the ability to compel information
transfers,233 the government may have a greater ability to compel cooperation
and participation in commons than private bodies, both through direct
acquisition and through conditional spending.234 Accordingly, government may
be better able to supply needed R&D and innovation inputs to commons-based,
targeted innovation activities in the public, commercial, or nonprofit sectors.
However, because commons—by their nature as collective, collaborative
231 See, e.g., George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem in
Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 914–19 (2011); Philip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic
Assessment of Current Law and Policy, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 542–49 (2007). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 33–56 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/
P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf.
232 See, e.g., BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42705, AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR
STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENT HOLDERS 21 (2012) (discussing a proposal from the American Antitrust
Institute to disclose proposed or maximum licensing terms); Cary et al., supra note 231, at 930–34; Richard J.
Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting Organizations, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 855,
857–59 (2011); Nelson, supra note 231, at 548–49; cf. Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting: The Case
for Patent Misuse, 51 IDEA 559, 560–82 (2011) (discussing various forms of opportunism in standard-setting
organizations and various doctrinal efforts to control it); Lauren E. Barrows, Note, Why the Enforcement
Agencies’ Recent Efforts Will Not Encourage Ex Ante Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting
Organizations, 89 TEX. L. REV. 967, 967–68 (2011) (noting continuing antitrust concerns over collusive
action, such as price-fixing, that may impede ex ante negotiations). See generally Charles T. (Chris) Compton,
Tumultuous Times: The Escalating US Debate on the Role of Antitrust in Standard Setting, COMPETITION L.
INT’L, Feb. 2009, at 29, 30–34 (discussing various standards licensing enforcement disputes and responses to
them).
233 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
234 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.,
547 U.S. 47, 59–61 (2006) (discussing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and noting that no limits to
spending conditions exist if the federal government could undertake the action by itself); United States v. Am.
Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 203–04 (2003) (plurality opinion) (same); cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601–07 (2012) (plurality opinion) (discussing coercion limits on federal spending
that penalizes states). In contrast, the government may be less capable than the private sector of acquiring
expertise in the form of human capital, particularly given limits on wages in government pay scales.
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enterprises—may tend toward control that is comparatively more distributed
than centralized,235 governments may be unlikely to direct and less likely to
fund broad, collaborative commons-based innovation activity. Further, at least
to date, government has tended not to collect or compel disclosure of
information held by commons participants, such as pricing and licensing
policies.236 More analysis is needed of these policies, as well as of
government-commons institutions.
E. Market Regulation
Market regulation is also a very broad category. It covers: (1) direct
product and process regulation; (2) information reporting and government
disclosures, which may also lead to (or induce private action to avoid) direct
product and process regulation;237 (3) recognition and certification
programs,238 the premises of which are to provide incentives to direct private
actions and to convey a market advantage that induces directed consumption
patterns and thus greater innovation;239 and (4) a wide variety of market-based
regulations, including market-entry, price, competition, and intellectualproperty-rights regulations. All of these may affect innovation incentives by
governing market-based returns. In addition, government may threaten to
engage in market regulation or entry to alter the effects of or induce changes in
private, market-based behaviors such as through nationalization, crown use,

235 See, e.g., Kapczynski, supra note 115, at 991 (distinguishing commons from property approaches to
scientific and cultural production by their “disaggregated governance,” compared to individual control, as well
as by the rules of access and sources of support).
236 See, e.g., Rudy Santore, Michael McKee & David Bjornstad, Patent Pools as a Solution to Efficient
Licensing of Complementary Patents? Some Experimental Evidence, 53 J.L. & ECON. 167, 169 n.5 (2010)
(noting various case studies and the absence of information on pricing and licensing).
237 See, e.g., WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION 4–5
(1992).
238 See, e.g., Climate Leadership Awards, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
climateleadership/awards/index.html (last updated Feb. 28, 2013) (describing a joint, government–private
recognition program for institutions and individuals in regard to leadership and to internal and supply-chain
reporting and reductions); History of ENERGY STAR, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.
energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_history (last visited May 12, 2013) (describing a joint, governmental
energy efficiency rating and voluntary labeling program for consumer household products).
239 See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-R-03-008, ENERGY STAR®—THE POWER TO PROTECT
THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH ENERGY EFFICIENCY 2–3 (2003) (discussing consumer lack of information, split
incentives, and credibility that reduces decision-making risks). See generally Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified
Green: The Law and Future of Environmental Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 147 (1993); Peter S. Menell,
Structuring a Market-Oriented Federal Eco-Information Policy, 54 MD. L. REV. 1435 (1995).
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exercise of statutory rights, statutory or compulsory licensing, and other
actions that affect private market returns.240
1. Product and Process Regulation
Much has been written about the ability to stimulate or discourage
innovation through direct government product and process regulation,
particularly environmental regulation, including but not limited to technologybased performance standards.241 In particular, some analyses address the
relationships among the various types of command-and-control regulation and
the way such regulation encourages and discourages technology
development.242 Other analyses contrast regulation with ex post liability for
damage caused by externalities and with tax or tradable permit scheme
measures designed to internalize externalities and provide continuous
environmental-improvement incentives.243 The relative effectiveness of these
choices may depend in part on the ability to quantify and monitor the relevant
activities at issue.244
240 See, e.g., Jakkrit Kuanpoth, Appropriate Patent Rules in Developing Countries—Some Deliberations
Based on Thai Legislation, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 447, 450 (2008) (discussing uncompensated “[c]rown
use” and distinguishing compulsory licensing); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Flexible Application of Injunctive Relief in
Intellectual Property Enforcement (with Reference to Lessons from the Emerging US Jurisprudence), in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 98, 100 (Xuan Li & Carlos M.
Correa eds., 2009) (noting the potential to tailor remedies to promote domestic innovation and foreign direct
investment); Luca Di Corato, Profit Sharing Under the Threat of Nationalization 20 (Swedish Univ. of Agric.
Sci. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2010:1, 2010), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/
58292/2/Luca_WP_01_10.pdf (modeling effects of investment and nationalization on Nash bargaining and
suggesting extension to “creeping expropriation”); supra notes 97–99, 181, 220 and accompanying text; see
also YEH, supra note 232, at 7–18 (discussing vague FRAND commitments and pending cases in the
International Trade Commission seeking exclusionary orders); Khan & Sokoloff, supra note 65, at 6 (noting
potential for patent expropriation without compensation in Britain in nineteenth century).
241 See, e.g., Nicholas A. Ashford et al., Using Regulation to Change the Market for Innovation, 9 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 419 (1985); Tomain, supra note 53, at 404 (discussing use of best available technology
standards to create demand to “pull” technology, and contrasting it with the “push” approach of investments to
solve a particular problem).
242 See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform
Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985); Craig N. Oren, Prevention
of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling Versus Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1988); David
Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740 (1983).
243 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Commentary, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 2341, 2376–91 (1996); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984). See generally ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 832–44 (1992).
244 See, e.g., BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 52; Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Commandand-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory
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Other analyses focus on underinvestment and underproduction of
innovations for environmental improvement because of their positive
spillovers and on internalizing and regulating negative externalities.245 Some
studies have sought to rank the innovation-inducing and technology-adoption
effectiveness of different environmental regulatory policies, but have
concluded that the results are ambiguous given competing influences of raised
direct costs of regulation and reduced costs of lowered output.246 The rankings
for innovation inducement may depend in part on “the innovator’s ability to
appropriate spillover benefits of new technologies to other firms, the costs of
innovation, environmental benefit functions, and the number of firms
producing emissions.”247 Similarly, the rankings for technology adoption may
depend on, among other things, the impact of the innovations and government
regulatory responses as costs of abatement are reduced.248 Much additional
work—particularly empirical analysis—still needs to be done to determine
how to better induce innovation through such regulatory policy, how much
innovation to induce, and how to determine the impact of technological change
in general and of government R&D spending in particular.249
In general terms, product or process regulation can induce “weak”
innovation, when dominant firms or new entrants can improve on existing
technologies, or “strong” innovation, when new entrants (and sometimes
established firms) introduce disruptive technologies and displace dominant
firms.250 Tinkering with market regulation, such as by adjusting patent
doctrines (e.g., the standard for nonobviousness), can affect the financial
Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887; Gloria E. Helfand, Standards Versus
Standards: The Effects of Different Pollution Restrictions, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 622 (1991); cf. John F. Duffy,
The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 53 (2004) (“[I]t may be a
much simpler matter to tell how many cars cross a bridge or how much electricity is consumed than to
determine how often an idea is used.”).
245 See, e.g., Popp, Newell & Jaffe, supra note 37, at 3–4 (noting the high uncertainty of innovation
outputs that leads to underinvestment of inputs and “‘dynamic increasing returns’” to technology from
learning-by-doing, learning-by-using, and network externality effects).
246 See id. at 13. Lowered output may be undesirable and thereby make an R&D subsidy preferable to, or
more effective combined with, an emissions tax. See id.
247 Id. at 12–14 (citing David Ulph, Environmental Policy and Technological Innovation, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE ENVIRONMENT (Carlo Carraro & Domenico Siniscalco eds.,
1997); Wesley A. Magat, The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Innovation, 43 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 4 (1979); Wesley A. Magat, Pollution Control and Technological Advance: A Dynamic Model of the
Firm, 5 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1978)).
248 See Popp, Newell & Jaffe, supra note 37, at 24–26.
249 Id. at 16–18, 20–22.
250 See, e.g., Nicholas A. Ashford & Ralph P. Hall, Regulation-Induced Innovation for Sustainable
Development, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring 2012, at 21, 21–22.
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incentives to shoot for weak or strong innovations.251 In turn, such market
regulation may alter the direction and nature of the innovation that would
otherwise be induced by direct product or process regulation. Strengthening
environmental regulatory controls may lead to greater innovation by new
entrants. New entrants not only may benefit from “innovation offsets” of
reduced production costs associated with reduced control costs, but also may
displace incumbent firms and provide a national comparative advantage,
particularly if stringent regulation is imposed at a comparatively later time.252
As some analysts have discussed, at least three factors affect the ability of
such direct regulation to induce innovation. But identifying the factors and
stating their influence is a far cry from analyzing their actual effects and
comparative influence.
The first factor is the willingness to innovate, which is affected by at least
the following four considerations: “attitudes towards changes in production in
general; . . . an understanding of the problem; . . . knowledge of possible
options and solutions; and . . . the ability to evaluate alternatives.”253 In turn,
each of these four considerations is affected by internal firm culture, risk
taking, and personnel expertise.
The second factor is the opportunity and motivation to innovate. This factor
is affected on the “supply” side at least by two considerations: the nature of the
regulation and the kind of technology “gap.” On the “demand” side, the second
factor is affected at least by the following three considerations: “opportunities
for cost savings or expansion of sales; . . . public demand for more
environmentally sound, eco-efficient, and safer industry, products, and
services; and . . . worker demands and pressures arising from industrial
relations concerns.”254
The third factor is the capacity to innovate. This capacity may be enhanced
by at least the following five considerations: “an understanding of the
251 See, e.g., John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 492 (2003) (discussing reduced static and
increased dynamic incentives of raising the nonobviousness bar); cf. Christopher-Paul Milne & Joyce Tait,
Evolution Along the Government–Governance Continuum: FDA’s Orphan Products and Fast Track Programs
as Exemplars of “What Works” for Innovation and Regulation, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 733, 734 (2009) (noting
that the need for top-down regulatory control of risks imposes a higher bar for small entities in the lifesciences sector to enter the market, and the higher the bar the greater the ability of incumbents to maintain
their dominant position).
252 Ashford & Hall, supra note 250, at 21–22.
253 Id. at 22–23.
254 Id. at 23.
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problem; . . . knowledge of possible options and solutions; . . . the ability to
evaluate alternatives; . . . resident/available skills and capabilities to innovate;
and . . . access to, and interaction with, outsiders.”255 Self-evidently, each
consideration will be affected not only by internal firm culture and workplace
policies, but also by whether the field being regulated has extensive networks
for extra-firm collaboration.256
Where regulation itself impedes innovation, it may generate a need for
regulatory reform and induce regulatory innovation.257 Regulation also occurs
within economic sectors that directly affect the funding of innovation, such as
the financial sector. The financial sector recently has developed a higher-thanusual rate of litigation of its patented innovations.258 Some recent analysis has
suggested that in some cases financial regulations designed to reduce risks and
increase accountability may unintentionally have interfered with innovation
and entrepreneurship, venture capital, and forms of public offerings.259
Accordingly, market regulation as a strategy to promote product and
process innovation must be viewed very broadly indeed. Further, many
approaches to product and process regulation also raise trade concerns and
concerns with incentives to transfer research efforts to more lenient regulatory
jurisdictions. In particular, late-to-the-table countries (e.g., in regard to setting
and achieving environmental goals) may become more innovative than
countries achieving earlier regulatory compliance and having comparatively

255

Id.
Id.
257 See, e.g., Timothy A. Slating & Jay P. Kesan, Making Regulatory Innovation Keep Pace with
Technological Innovation, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1111–19 (discussing innovation-inducing measures—
including tax subsidies and product regulation for biofuels—and burdens of regulating biofuel blending that
call for revision to maximize the ability to capture social welfare from the regulation of biofuels); cf. Milne &
Tait, supra note 251, at 735–36 (noting the need for regulatory innovation, focusing on three competing
perspectives—innovation communities, policy makers, and stakeholders–and identifying two important
developments—policy networks and formal advisory functions—within the regulatory process); Khan &
Sokoloff, supra note 65, at 7 (discussing patent system regulatory responses in Britain following the Crystal
Palace Exhibition of 1851, which brought attention to the innovative patent institutions in the United States).
258 See, e.g., Harhoff, supra note 41, at 55 (discussing restrictions on financial inputs to innovation); Josh
Lerner, The Litigation of Financial Innovations, 53 J.L. & ECON. 807, 827–28 (2010) (noting that the
disproportionate increases in litigation over financial services patents are consistent with nuisance-suit
behavior that imposes both deadweight losses of licensing payments and innovation costs of distorted
incentives skewed to socially unproductive litigation).
259 See, e.g., Jose Miguel Mendoza, Christoph Van der Elst & Eric P. M. Vermeulen, Entrepreneurship
and Innovation: The Hidden Costs of Corporate Governance in Europe, 7 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 3–4
(2010).
256
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fewer regulation-induced incentives for R&D. As one former government
official has noted:
[O]ne of the things we did study in the late ’90s and one of the things
we noticed about environmental regulations in the United States was
that the rise of the environmental regulatory regime from the ’70s to
’80s actually drove innovation for about 15 to 20 years because
companies were scrambling to develop technologies that could meet
these new environmental protection requirements. But once
everybody had reached the level of compliance required by the
statute, that kind of became a floor, and there was no incentive built
into the system for anybody to do anything that was better than the
regulations required. Companies who were capable of doing zero
emission factories got no benefit, no economic incentive, out of it. So
then toward the end of the ’90s you started to see a whole lot of other
countries that were then putting their environmental regimes in place,
to start attracting a lot of R & D in the environmental technology area
and to be developing innovative technologies, more innovative than
what a lot of United States companies were doing. So that illustrates
the impact of those kinds of regulatory issues; the other components
here I think are obvious, investing in infrastructure, not just the
physical plant and equipment, in roads and bridges and air traffic
controller systems, which remain important, but over the years
investing in the IT, in telecommunications infrastructure, in
broadband capacity, all the things that make innovation possible as
well as the work force.260

2. Information Regulation
Turning to the alternatives to product or process regulation, additional
analyses of environmental regulatory options have addressed mandatory
information disclosures and their use to generate private environmental
improvement and innovation. For example, given adverse publicity and
stockholder and public responses, it is widely thought that requiring disclosure
of toxic chemical releases has led to efforts at and investments in R&D to
achieve reduction of releases.261 This effect may be similar to that observed for
260 Can.–U.S. Proceedings 2006, supra note 15, at 54 (including comments of White House technology
advisor and former Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Technology Policy Kelly Carnes).
261 See, e.g., James T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the Toxics
Release Inventory Data, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 98 (1995); Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen,
Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 109 (1997); cf. Seema Arora & Timothy N. Cason, Why Do Firms Volunteer to Exceed
Environmental Regulations? Understanding Participation in EPA’s 33/50 Program, 72 LAND ECON. 413
(1996) (discussing similar reductions through voluntary efforts and disclosures); Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip
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recognition and certification, which may provide the public with information
that drives purchasing and thus feeds back to innovation incentives.262 In this
regard, the forthcoming disclosure of GHG data from domestic-law-required
regulatory permits263 and national-plan-imposed efforts to track emissions264
will be very interesting to watch.
3. Recognition and Certification Programs
Recognition and certification programs act principally as intrinsic
motivation-affecting measures or as demand-pull instruments to induce
innovation. They are thus contingent on personal preferences, institutional
cultures, and market perceptions of the comparative benefits of the recognized
or certified outputs in the relevant markets.265 Although an extensive literature
is beginning to address teacher certifications and effectiveness,266 relatively
little theoretical and empirical analysis has studied the innovation-inducing
effects of certifications on technology development and dissemination.267
Much more needs to be done in this area.

Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118
Q.J. ECON. 409 (2003) (discussing consumer and consequent production responses to posting information on
restaurant hygiene).
262 See, e.g., Popp et al., supra note 37, at 9–10 (citing Richard G. Newell, Adam B. Jaffe & Robert N.
Stavins, The Induced Innovation Hypothesis and Energy-Saving Technological Change, 114 Q.J. ECON. 941
(1999)) (discussing modeling showing that the effects of energy prices on innovation were greatest in years
following adoption of product labeling requirements).
263 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 98 (2012) (containing the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Mandatory
Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Rule).
264 See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3.3,
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22; UNFCCC, supra note 1, at arts. 4.1(a), 12.1(a).
265 See, e.g., DIRECTORATE GEN. ENV’T, EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE POTENTIAL OF MARKET PULL
INSTRUMENTS FOR PROMOTING INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5,
12–20 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/innovation_technology/pdf/market_pull_
exec_summary.pdf (discussing a broader range of demand pull mechanisms that include certifications;
describing various “company push factors” that include size, company nature/history, supply chain position,
competitive edge, corporate policies, path dependence, capital availability, and technology spillovers; and
listing measures to enhance visibility, adoption, and flexibility of demand pull measures); supra notes 42–49
and accompanying text.
266 See, e.g., Thomas J. Kane, Jonah E. Rockoff & Douglas O. Staiger, What Does Certification Tell Us
About Teacher Effectiveness? Evidence from New York City (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 12155, 2006).
267 Cf. Milé Terziovski, Damien Power & Amrik S. Sohal, The Longitudinal Effects of the ISO 9000
Certification Process on Business Performance, 146 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES. 580, 580–81 (2003)
(identifying the principal motivation to certify as consumer pressure and noting major gaps in research into
operations/quality management).
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4. Market Regulation
Turning to market regulation, both intellectual property and antitrust law
are the most obvious places to look (although price controls, crown use,
statutory and compulsory licensing, and other forms of regulation of private
market returns may also be used).268 As suggested above, intellectual property
is best viewed as a form of market regulation in that it provides a government
subsidy (a property right) and government regulation of market behaviors
through regulatory clearance and litigation mechanisms, some of which may be
brought by the government.269 Analyses of direct measures to restrict static
social welfare losses and balance them against dynamic innovation-incentive
losses—such as price controls or compulsory licensing—have proven
theoretically intractable.270
Much effort has therefore gone into analyzing whether broader or narrower
intellectual property rights will provide the best balance of incentives and
access to promote both static and dynamic innovation. As the author of one
recent modeling effort stated, however, such analysis is “embryonic,” and has
yet to even begin its “infancy.”271 Another recent empirical analysis, which
268 See, e.g., Lionel Nesta, Francesco Vona & Francesco Nicolli, Environmental Policies, Product Market
Regulation and Innovation in Renewable Energy (Dec. 21, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2192441 (discussing product market regulation effects
under different forms of competition). For an excellent historical discussion of antitrust approaches to
regulating innovation in the United States, see B. Zorina Khan, Antitrust and Innovation Before the Sherman
Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 757, 759–60, 784–85 (2011), which noted continuity of federal approaches under the
Sherman Act with earlier, state-based regulatory strategies, and early federal reliance on a market orientation
and a network of regulations and antimonopoly rulings, except in regard to the state-owned enterprise of the
postal service. The other forms of market-return regulation are not discussed further here, but warrant
additional consideration as they affect innovation incentives.
269 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2319(a) (2006).
270 See, e.g., Scotchmer, supra note 18, at 33–35 (discussing competing incentives of strong or weak
protection for first- and second-generation innovators and the lack of perfect solutions through ex ante
licensing); Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Competition Within Intellectual Property Regimes: The Instance of Patent
Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW: NEW FRONTIERS 27 (Steven Anderman & Ariel
Ezrachi eds., 2011) (discussing the “analytic stalemate” between exclusionary rights and open access).
271 John M. Golden, Innovation Dynamics, Patents, and Dynamic-Elasticity Tests for the Promotion of
Progress, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 47, 50 (2010); cf. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against
Patents 1, 15–19 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis Research Div. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No.
2012-035A, 2012), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf (discussing historical and
comparative evidence that weak patent systems mildly increase innovation, but strong patent systems retard
innovation); Andrea Blasco, Disclosure and Collaboration in Dynamic R&D Races 2–3 (Mar. 15, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961356 (noting
that the intellectual property literature has not to date considered the effects of rights on incentives for
collaboration of sequential innovators with pioneering innovators, and arguing that weak patent protection may
fail to promote innovation because of strategic decisions to ignore disclosed and unprotected knowledge).
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collected a comprehensive dataset in a particular field (plant variety
innovation), has suggested that intellectual property rights generally were not
significant for innovation.272 Again, that finding may not translate beyond the
particular field, may have been historically dependent on the particular
institutions and their development, and thus may not provide useful insights to
extrapolate to other contexts.273
Notwithstanding the tremendous efforts by some of our brightest minds,
things have not progressed too much past the identification of at least three
basic sets of competing concerns that must be assessed and balanced in all
sorts of situations. These three concerns are: (a) the adequacy of incentive
effects, transactions costs, effects on cumulative innovation, and loss of
consumer surplus from higher prices; (b) the adequacy of consumer signaling
to producers and overinvestment in intellectual products; and (c) the
duplication of innovative efforts resulting from the incentive effects, wasted
efforts to design around rights to provide functional equivalents, and inefficient
development of initial innovation prospects.274 Debatably, there may be some
situations where certain forms of intellectual property rights are thought to be
clearly needed (such as patents for pharmaceuticals, even when they impose
high social costs)275 or to be wholly ineffectual (such as patents for
pharmaceuticals for “neglected diseases”).276

272

See Paul J. Heald & Susannah Chapman, Veggie Tales: Pernicious Myths About Patents, Innovation,
and Crop Diversity in the Twentieth Century, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1051, 1053–56.
273 For plant varieties, special utility patents exist for asexually reproduced varieties, and special
protection exists for sexually reproduced varieties, in the form of Plant Variety Certificates, which supplement
utility patent protection in plants recognized in 1985. See Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376; Plant
Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-577, tit. I, § 1, 84 Stat. 1542, 1542 (1970) (current version at 7 U.S.C.
§ 2321 (2006)); Ex parte Hibberd, No. 645-91, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 444–45 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 18, 1985).
The effects of such additional protection on innovation are theoretically uncertain. Cf. Heald & Chapman,
supra note 272, at 1054–56, 1058–60.
274 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2
(1969) (identifying three logical fallacies in the “nirvana approach” to public-policy economics); Kitch, supra
note 159; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483
(1996); Merges & Nelson, supra note 159; Fisher, supra note 125, at 4–10. Note that for other public goods, it
is often thought to be efficient when producers do not obtain full social returns, given the existence of positive
externalities.
275 Some have argued that the pharmaceutical industry is such a situation, given the high costs of R&D
and product approval, the uncertainty of successful results from particular research paths, ease of reverse
engineering, and low costs of generic production. See Fisher, supra note 125, at 11. But for low-income
markets, some adjustment (such as through compulsory licensing) may be necessary to address social welfare
losses, albeit accompanied by higher transaction costs and diminished ex ante innovation incentives. See id. at
12–13. However, there is no theoretically necessary reason why alternatives to patent rights might not work as
well (or better) than intellectual property rights (e.g., more substantially subsidizing pharmaceutical research

SARNOFF GALLEYSPROOFS1

2013]

GOVERNMENT CHOICES IN INNOVATION FUNDING

6/11/2013 9:03 AM

1151

The optimal strength and scope of intellectual property rights also depend
on multiple, competing considerations. These include the following eight
concerns: (a) private reliance on intellectual property rights as a means of
recouping investments in innovation, combined with government market
regulation of the returns on such investments;277 (b) public funding of inputs to
private research and development; (c) values of private researchers (or their
firms) regarding the public’s interests; (d) the pioneering or cumulative nature
of the research; (e) the degree of centralization of firm structures; (f)
dependence on intellectual property for funding of R&D or firm ventures; (g)
documentation and publication practices that make it harder to build on others’
work or to avoid infringement or clear rights; and (h) various types of network
externalities.278 As remains true almost a decade after it was said, “[e]fforts to
identify an optimal balance of these various effects continue, but no solution is
yet in sight.”279
Antitrust analyses reflect similar theoretical and empirical limitations.
Much has been written about differences of innovation and product markets
and the need to differentiate antitrust and intellectual property doctrines as a
result of different market structures and dynamics for different products.280
Innovation market concerns reflect the insight “that a merger between the only

and clinical trials, or direct government development of pharmaceuticals). The factors that may affect these
comparisons are discussed further supra in Part I.
276 See, e.g., So et al., supra note 66, at 2081. Note that effective price discrimination may not be
practically possible, and even when possible, it may not be profit maximizing. See, e.g., Flynn, Hollis &
Palmedo, supra note 170, at 190.
277 See, e.g., Cohen, Levin & Mowery, supra note 36, at 548–49; Fisher, supra note 125, at 11 n.24, 19–
21. See generally Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and
Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552,
2000).
278 See Fisher, supra note 125, at 17–18, 24–25.
279 Id. at 9.
280 See, e.g., Ordover, supra note 149, at 514–18 (discussing intertemporal market linkages and
interactions between upstream research and downstream products, noting particular concerns when firms
compete in both markets, suggesting greater solicitude for upstream research markets, and describing four
contextual considerations to improve rule-of-reason analysis); J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Antitrust Regulation of Innovation Markets: Remarks at the ABA Antitrust Intellectual Property
Conference 1–4 (Feb. 5, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/090205innovationspeech.pdf
(discussing the history of regulating innovation markets, practical constraints on using antitrust analysis, and
the temporal relationships of innovation, product markets, and concerns over joint venturing activity). See
generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119
YALE L.J. 384 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation, 2011 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 637.
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two, or two of a few, firms in R&D might increase the incentive to suppress at
least one of the research paths.”281
Again, as a recent criticism of even a limited discussion of innovation
markets has stated, the “fundamental flaws in the innovation market concept
are . . . [that we] don’t know about the relationship between market structure
and effect, that error costs are high, and that competition is multidimensional.
In other words, we don’t know a lot and acting on our ignorance . . . is
costly.”282 Historically, such research markets or activities have been treated
differently from other markets within intellectual property law to prevent their
domination by exclusive rights,283 just as they have been treated differently in
competition law. More recently, some scholarship has sought to identify
criteria for determining the kinds of entry-blocking or entry-burdening
innovations in research markets that would warrant antitrust scrutiny or
immunity for product markets, while recognizing the difficulties of assessing
whether the consumer-perceived advantages are genuine and warrant the
corresponding reductions in competition.284
Intellectual property, of course, can be a barrier to innovation, particularly
where broad rights or multiple rights need to be licensed to perform research or
produce products, if licensing in the research market is inefficient.285 This
281 MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 297 (2009).
282 Geoffrey A. Manne, Assuming More Than We Know About Innovation Markets: A Review of Michael
Carrier’s Innovation in the 21st Century, 61 ALA. L. REV. 553, 555 (2010) (reviewing CARRIER, supra note
281). But cf. Michael A. Carrier, Innovation for the 21st Century: A Response to Seven Critics, 61 ALA. L.
REV. 597, 601–03 (2010) (noting the limited scope of the suggested analysis, but its comparative benefits to
existing analysis).
283 See, e.g., Henrik Holzapfel & Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Cross-Atlantic Dialog on Experimental Use and
Research Tools, 48 IDEA 123, 133–44 (2007–2008) (noting the origins of the experimental-use doctrine as a
statutory interpretation of (non)infringement rather than as a defense to infringement, and tracing its history of
and focus on noncommercial research). See generally Ofer Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation in Patent Law:
Making Sense of Incentives, 50 IDEA 723, 741–72 (2009–2010) (discussing innovation-inducing effects from
comparing patent scope with experimental-use exceptions).
284 See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Anticompetitive Innovation and the Quality of Invention, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 4–5 (2012) (suggesting antitrust immunity for innovations that merely burden
competition, scrutiny for innovations that prevent market entry, and invalidity for such inventions that are not
“genuine[ly]” defined as having “a feature that consumers would pay a premium to acquire, though the
necessary premium is less than the five to ten percent over the existing price that often accompanies marketdefinition analysis” and thereby “transforms a product into a pure substitute in the eyes of consumers”); see
also id. at 19–33.
285 See, e.g., Cahoy & Glenna, supra note 225, at 427–30; cf. Condon & Sinha, supra note 65, at 11–13
(discussing concentration of technologies and intellectual property rights in a limited number of companies
from very few countries, thus raising concerns for biodiversity, affordable access, and innovation).
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reiterates the concern, although this time within intellectual property law,
about whether innovation markets should be subject to differential treatment
under a broad, experimental-use doctrine or a similar doctrine (e.g., fair
use).286 The need for external or internal controls of such rights may depend on
the degree to which private ordering solutions are effective. Such solutions
may include the following four approaches: (a) vertical integration (firm
consolidation) by acquiring the rights; (b) joint-venturing or cross-licensing;
(c) patent-pooling; and (d) standard-setting (with relevant commitments to
provide reasonable cost access).287 In turn, the ability to use any of these
solutions may depend on the following five factors: (a) a limited number of
rights at issue; (b) a limited number of parties who need to coordinate; (c) the
existence of synergies or complements for the technology; (d) the duration of
the market for the technology;288 and, of course, (e) antitrust-law treatment of
each of these approaches and factors. Misuse doctrine may bring these
potential innovation-reducing concerns within intellectual property law without
limiting the concerns to effects on competition.289
5. General Considerations
At a basic level, theory tends to distinguish the process of innovation from
the market that evaluates the innovation and determines whether particular
innovations are viewed as successful. Thus, one recent economic review
distinguished useful innovations from useless innovations and innovation
markets from product markets, while attributing “Schumpeterian creativity” to
the comparatively better ability to imagine future products and production
provided at lower factor-of-production prices.290 Further, some analysts
attribute successful entrepreneurial activity to the rational, profit-maximizing
efforts of those with talent and who seek to create monopoly rents through

286 See, e.g., Holzapfel & Sarnoff, supra note 286, at 180–84 (discussing expected returns in regard to
research tool markets); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1177, 1205 (2000) (discussing factors to consider in adopting a fair-use approach to patent
noninfringement).
287 See, e.g., Cahoy & Glenna, supra note 225, at 440–45.
288 See id. at 446–52.
289 See, e.g., Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 478–79 (2011)
(encouraging use of misuse doctrine to address innovation harms without equating it to antitrust analysis);
Thomas F. Cotter, IP Misuse and Innovation Harm, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 52, 55–59 (2011),
http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_96_Cotter.pdf (noting concerns with line-drawing and solicitude for
“false positives” or “false negatives”); Lim, supra note 232, at 560.
290 Israel M. Kirzner, Between Useful and Useless Innovation: The Entrepreneurial Role, in HANDBOOK
OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 12, 14.
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innovation from which they can derive over-profit. In turn, the highest private
returns lead to the investment (allocation) of talent and its application toward
particular innovative activities.291 And, of course, others attribute non-profitmaximizing (extrinsic or intrinsic) motivations to innovators (i.e., those with
talent or other creativity who do not merely imitate).292
From a market-based and institutional perspective, rather than that of the
individual, “increased competition or entry threat induces firms to invest more
in innovation in order to escape the competitive threat.”293 Similarly,
innovation should be understood as a continuous and temporally extended
cycle among creators, entrepreneurs, the market, and laws, and trade
liberalization not only induces investment, but also permits enhanced R&D
spillovers.294
Further, the category of entrepreneurs as a social group or entrepreneurship
as a status may also affect both choices to innovate and returns that particular
innovations achieve. As a recent study noted, although the economic benefits
of entrepreneurship are large and economic returns on education are higher for
entrepreneurs than for employees, the preference for entrepreneurship is “not
high” among more highly educated individuals.295
Whether private incentives for allocating either innovative resources or
talent apply in the same way to publicly funded innovation activity is at least
questionable. Even assuming profit maximization as the basic motivation for
funding recipients, such publicly funded actors may either be risk-averse or
foresee greater returns from continued public funding than from the potential
for market returns on their monetary, time, and effort investments. Rentseeking may further jeopardize profits of established productive sectors and
adversely affect innovation and investment.296

291 Marcus Dejardin, Entrepreneurship and Rent-Seeking Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 17, 18–19.
292 See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text.
293 Philippe Aghion, Industrial Policy, Entrepreneurship and Growth, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 45, 45.
294 See id.; see also MICHAEL A. GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIES
FOR A DYNAMIC WORLD 94–95, 122–23 (2008).
295 Mirjam van Praag, Who Values the Status of the Entrepreneur?, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at 24, 24.
296 Dejardin, supra note 291, at 20.
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As others have noted, countries have adopted very different industrial
policies for development, including: import substitution policies to develop
local demand (as in Latin America); export promotion policies, achieved
through tariff and nontariff barriers and maintaining undervalued exchange
rates (as in Korea or Japan); and targeted subsidies to industries and efforts to
develop “national champion” firms (as in France and China) and different
intellectual property doctrinal standards.297 Since the 1980s, a “Washington
consensus” has developed among international lending and aid institutions and
economists emphasizing nontargeted policies that improve investment
markets.298 But targeted or other efforts to protect “infant industries” from
lower cost foreign competition, while developing domestic acumen through
“learning-by-doing,” have not demonstrated notably higher productivity
growth or correlation to increased skill than in the absence of such efforts.299
Nevertheless, in theory, targeted investment may overcome private firm
disincentives to invest in new sectors of an economy given existing crosssectoral externalities that reflect and reinforce existing patterns of
specialization.300 Even in existing developed economies that tend to innovate
on the “world technology frontier,” there may be a need for targeted industrial
policy to minimize or overcome innovation in the “wrong direction” that
maximizes private returns but does not promote long-term growth or other
socially beneficial production.301
Similarly, financing constraints for particular kinds of firms and R&D more
generally may lead to suboptimal innovation, in part due to the lack of an
intermediate market for the outputs of innovation, “such as ideas, patents,
licenses, blueprints, prototypes, etc.”302 Various reasons exist to think that
financing for R&D will be suboptimal compared to financing for capital
assets—particularly for new entrants or small firms—and the problem may be
further exacerbated by differential tax treatment of R&D and intangibles

297 See GOLLIN, supra note 294, at 308–21; Aghion, supra note 293; see also U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N,
PUB. 4199, CHINA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES, AND
FRAMEWORKS FOR MEASURING THE EFFECTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY (2010).
298 Aghion, supra note 293, at 46.
299 See id. at 47–48.
300 See id. at 47–49.
301 Id. at 50; see Aghion, supra note 63, at 2 (noting the need for industrial policy); Arrow, supra note 13,
at 21 (noting increasing returns-to-scale theories based on straightforward economies of scale, learning by
doing, and the fact that costs but not rewards of innovation are independent of the size of markets).
302 Harhoff, supra note 41, at 55.

SARNOFF GALLEYSPROOFS1

1156

6/11/2013 9:03 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1087

relative to other investments.303 Hence, government intervention of various
kinds may be warranted, particularly as venture capital is not fully effective at
reaching innovative private firms.304
In summary, far too little is known at present to make informed choices
among the different forms of market regulatory measures, much less among
the different forms of innovation funding choices available to government.
CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion should make clear, the choices of government
funding substitute for, complement, and interact with each other in various
complex ways that are highly contingent on institutions and their cultures. No
choice or combination of government innovation funding mechanism is clearly
theoretically preferable. The taxonomy discussed above, moreover,
demonstrates that too much choice exists for government decision makers who
may have limited public support for or limited ability to make informed
decisions regarding what will induce the most invention, innovation, and
diffusion of technology. Given the concerns about underproduction of
innovation due to externalities and positive spillovers, and given the impending
climate-change needs, we likely need to more aggressively adopt and expand
multiple funding choices. In particular, this includes expanding commonscreation and commons-management so as to maximize innovation
infrastructure in both the public and private sectors. At a minimum, we need
government to both provide more funding to innovation overall and to induce
the market to supply additional funding.
Further, as we move forward, we will need to better evaluate the choices
that we make to better avoid wasting massive resources and opportunities
when seeking to generate desperately needed innovation outputs. In particular,
we need to understand and track the outputs better, interrogate and evaluate the

303

See id. at 57–58 (discussing collateral and liquidity problems and information asymmetries, high
adjustment costs for R&D—particularly regarding human capital losses, and financing of innovation
principally from equity or retained earnings rather than debt).
304 See id. at 59; see also William R. Kerr & Ramana Nanda, Financing Constraints and
Entrepreneurship, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 36, at
88.
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internal cultures of both private entities and public bureaucracies, and match
actual decision making with developing theoretical and empirical analyses.
Hopefully this Article will contribute to efforts to create better information,
better understanding, and better decision making.

